VP v SP [2025] EWFC 447 (B)

Judgment date: 20 November 2025

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/b/2025/447

Deputy District Judge Cassidy Hope. Judgment in financial remedy proceedings, addressing needs-based distribution where one party is the primary carer of a disabled adult child.

As conditional order had not yet been pronounced, DDJ Cassidy Hope confirmed that she had no jurisdiction to make a substantive financial remedy order (Munks v Munks [1985] FLR 576). Relying on FPR 29.15 and JP v NP [2014] EWHC 1101 (Fam), this judgment therefore constitutes an indication of outcome, with the order to be drafted and take effect once conditional order is pronounced.

Background

The applicant wife, VP (aged 57), and the respondent husband, SP (aged 58), began their relationship in c.2006, married in 2007, and separated in 2019, making this a marriage of approximately 12 years. VP petitioned in 2020 (prior to the no-fault divorce regime), but conditional order had not yet been pronounced at the time of judgment.

The parties have one son together, XP (aged 18), who has significant disabilities and is unlikely to ever live independently. VP, who is XP’s full-time carer, left the family home with XP in 2019. SP has not spent time with XP for several years. SP also has an adult son, JP, from a previous relationship.

As XP’s full-time carer, VP’s income comes from carer’s allowance, universal credit and child benefit. Although currently unemployed, SP recently worked as an HGV driver, earning c.£29,000 net p.a. in addition to £15,000 p.a. of rental income from JP and JP’s partner who reside with him in the FMH.

There has been extensive litigation between the parties, including Children Act 1989 and Family Law Act 1996 proceedings. Findings of domestic abuse were made against SP in the children proceedings, and a child arrangements order was made providing that XP live with VP. A non-molestation order was in force between 2021 and 2024.

VP issued Form A in 2023.

Procedural history

The financial remedy proceedings were protracted and beset by delay and non-compliance. The first hearing was in March 2024. Difficulties arose with late service of Forms E, incomplete disclosure and missed hearings.

It was recorded in error that the hearing on 22 July 2024 which took place before DDJ Cassidy Hope was an FDR, when in fact it was a directions hearing. In light of the fact that this hearing was not an FDR, the judge corrected this under the slip rule, confirming that she was not barred by FPR 9.17 from determining the final hearing.

The final hearing took place on 10 October 2025 at which VP was represented by counsel and the SP appeared in person.

Given the earlier findings of domestic abuse, the provisions of FPR Part 3A and PD 3AB applied. Special measures were implemented accordingly. In circumstances where there was no QLR and SP was prohibited from cross-examining VP, the court adopted the approach of asking SP’s pre-submitted questions on his behalf, consistent with Re Z (Prohibition on Cross-examination: No QLR) [2024] EWFC 22.

The parties were relatively close in terms of the outcome; however, they differed in relation to:

• whether VP had failed to disclose further resources, particularly inheritance and income from business ventures;
• whether SP’s cashed-in pension should be ‘added back’;
• whether certain debts (notably a historic debt secured against the FMH (‘G debt’) and credit card liabilities) were matrimonial; and
• the extent to which VP’s needs justified departure from equality.

Both parties agreed that the FMH (valued at £525,000) should be sold, with a proposal that it be purchased by SP’s adult son, JP, thereby reducing sale costs.

In her judgment, DDJ Cassidy Hope set out the relevant law, including s 25 MCA 1973 and Peel J’s extremely helpful summary of the law in WC v HC [2022] EWFC 22.

Key findings

Resources and disclosure

The judge rejected SP’s allegations that VP had concealed assets or income. VP had been involved in various small businesses (ranging from providing disability services in the community to a clothes rental service) and fundraising ventures. However, the court accepted her evidence that these monies had been spent and that none of the businesses had significant value. The judge also rejected SP’s assertions that VP was due to receive further inheritance and/or that she had concealed what she had already received.

VP’s argument for an ‘add-back’ of SP’s cashed-in pension failed. Applying Vaughan v Vaughn [2008] 1 FLR 1108, the judge held that the pension had been used to meet living expenses following loss of employment and did not amount to wanton dissipation.

Matrimonial and non-matrimonial property

The judge noted an ‘air of artificiality’ in assessing the matrimonial status of assets in a strict needs case, but nevertheless applied Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26 as follows:

1. The FMH, although originally owned by SP prior to the relationship, had clearly become matrimonial property through long use as the marital home and adaption for the parties’ child, XP.
2. The G debt, which originated from SP’s pre-marital property, was held to be non-matrimonial.
3. Credit card and loan liabilities incurred during the marriage, including those in the parties’ sole names, were treated as matrimonial.

Needs

The case was firmly needs-based. DDJ Cassidy Hope found VP’s financial needs were significantly greater than SP’s due to her lifelong caring responsibilities for XP, her limited earning capacity and the need for suitable adapted accommodation.

SP retained a greater earning capacity and an additional potential housing resource through remaining in the FMH with his adult son, JP.

Outcome

Having applied s 25 MCA 1973, the judge concluded that VP’s needs justified a substantial departure from equal sharing in her favour. The judge ordered that the house be sold (whether to JP or on the open market) and that from the gross proceeds, the parties were to pay:

• the mortgage;
• the secured charge;
• costs of sale;
• £6,000 towards SP’s credit card;
• £3,746 towards VP’s credit card;
• the remainder divided such that VP receive 71% and SP receive 29%, save that the G debt is to be met from SP’s share.

The judge refused VP’s costs application.

Significance

This case reinforces well-known principles, such as the limited scope of add-back arguments where funds are used for living expenses and the (post-Standish) approach to matrimonialisation of assets and liabilities. Further, the case provides a useful insight of the practical application of special measures and cross-examination restrictions in cases involving domestic abuse. Above all, it underscores the centrality of needs, particularly where one party has lifelong caring responsibilities for a disabled child.

This judgment has not been certified as citable pursuant to Practice Note (Citation of Cases: Restrictions and Rules) [2001] WLR 1001.