W v X [2025] EWHC 1696 (Fam)

Judgment date: 23 June 2025

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/fam/2025/1696

Schedule 1 ‘big money’ case before Mr Justin Warshaw KC (sitting as a deputy High Court judge) concerning the financial provision of C.

Background

The applicant mother, ‘M’, was aged 45 and the respondent father, ‘F’, was aged 36 at the time of the final hearing in June 2025. They were both French nationals who had met in an unnamed country in 2015. They were in a committed relationship and were found by the judge to be engaged in 2019. Although F’s wealth is not particularised in the judgment, his business ventures were described at ‘phenomenally successful’ ([3]). M’s application under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 concerned their child, C, aged 8, who had an ADHD diagnosis that required medication and a chaperone at school.

There were many interim applications, including unsuccessful applications for MPS and LSPO by M, and an attempt at mediation that preceded the final hearing. In addition, there were concurrent Section 8 Children Act proceedings, with a final hearing listed the following month in July 2025.

The judge made negative observations of the parties’ written and oral evidence: ‘neither party’s written evidence was edifying’ ([21]) and he found both to be ‘unsatisfactory witnesses’ ([22]). He also referred to the irrelevant issues raised including the parties’ engagement ([25]), the creation of wealth ([25]) and the length and quality of the parties’ relationship ([25]). This criticism is a caution not to plead a Schedule 1 case like a financial remedies case under MCA 1972.

Open offers

The parties sent first open offers in October 2024. They agreed on some points, including school fees and extras. The differences are set out at [48], namely:

1. Maintenance/HECSA – M wanted £290,000 p.a. and F offered £194,000 p.a. – a difference of £96,000.
2. Contributions to C – M wanted £5,000 for C’s birthday party and £35,000 to be invested for C. F offered £40,000 for C’s birthday party to be paid directly to suppliers and did not offer any investment fund. No specific context was given to explain the reason for these sizeable sums.
3. Security – M sought £1m and F did not offer any security.
4. Costs – M sought F to pay £197,000 towards her outstanding legal fees. F offered no contribution to her costs.

The parties withdrew their open offers and filed second open offers in May 2025. F’s second offer ‘significantly reduced’ ([50]) the financial provision he had previously offered, including offering £138,000 p.a. in maintenance (£56,000 p.a. less).

W’s second open offer was vastly increased. Most notably, she sought maintenance of £771,000 p.a. (a £481,000 p.a. increase) and £660,233 for her debts and prospective legal fees (as opposed to £197,000 for outstanding fees per her first open offer).

Held

1. C should continue living at the family home with M and F to meet the rental payments (currently £178,200 p.a.) and index linked to the RPI.
2. F to pay M maintenance/HECSA of £225,000 p.a. CPI linked to continue to the end of C’s secondary education or conclusion of first degree including a gap year (the term was previously agreed in open offers).
3. F to pay C’s school fees and extras (previously agreed).
4. F to pay M a lump sum of £559,000 for W’ debts to two companies, HMRC and for her legal fees, including her Section 8 children proceedings.
5. The G Wagon car to be transferred from F to M, claimed to be worth £140,000.
6. F to pay M’s costs, with the acknowledgement that M had already contributed £140,000 to her costs from the sale of a watch.

Housing

The parties agreed that C’s housing provision would be met by rental payments. The judge adjourned M’s settlement of property claim in case she sought this in the future ([59]). F initially proposed to cap the rent and, as the family home’s rent exceeded this, then sought for M to downsize. J held that C’s best interests were met by staying in the home and ordered the rent to be paid without a cap. If M and C move, there will be a cap equivalent to the family home’s current rent.

Income needs and standard of living

It was accepted that M did not have an earning capacity due to being C’s primary carer. The judge was critical of M’s presentation of her income needs; she had produced three budgets of wildly varying totals. He remarked ‘I do not find any of the budgets produced by M remotely helpful. They are budgets which are plainly pitched at a claim under the Matrimonial Causes Act. They are not child focused.’ ([64].) As such, he took the view that he ‘must step back’ and consider a ‘fair figure’ taking into account the parties’ standard of living.

In applying the law, the judge at [53] referred to Peel J’s summary of the principles under Schedule 1 in Y v Z [2024] EWFC 4.^[1] In particular, standard of living was considered a ‘highly material factor’ in a big money case even though it is not a statutory factor found in paragraph 4 of Schedule 1. However, in reference to Collardeau-Fuchs v Fuchs [2022] EWFC 135,^[2] this factor should not ‘dominate’ the picture and depends on the facts. The judge later confirmed that he ‘must’ consider standard of living as an ‘important factor in this case where C has been exposed to it for a relatively long period of his life and he will continue to be exposed to it in the future when he is with F’ ([64]). This distinguishes this case from other Schedule 1 applications involving parents who have had a brief or fleeting relationship.

The phrase that the child’s standard of living should not be totally or ‘entirely out of kilter’ appears a number of times in the judgment, the phrase being borrowed from Al Hussein v Al Maktoum [2021] EWFC 94.^[3] The award of £225,000 p.a. is almost a mid-point between the parties’ first open offers, though slightly closer to F’s position.

Lump sum

Set against ‘F’s wealth and lavish living’ ([67]) the judge had ‘no hesitation’ in finding that M should not be burdened with debt or forced to use her own assets of £1.55m to pay them off (though note the figure comprised the Form E1 chattel valuations which were the purchase price, rather than current resale value – [39]). The lump sum ordered of £559,000 meant she could be entirely debt free.

Security

M sought £1m in her first open offer and £3m in her second, on the basis that F had forged documents, may not pay and has no assets in the UK. The judge did not accept this and found F to be committed to C and unlikely to default. Consequently, no security was ordered.

Costs

Interestingly, the judgment contextualised the significant legal fees incurred by the parties, which collectively totalled £825,000 – a substantial figure, with reference to their standard of living as F’s holidays in 2024 alone had cost £720,000 ([21]).

The judge reminded himself that the ‘clean sheet’ rule applies in Schedule 1 per CPR rule 44.2. F had criticised M’s significant legal fees and litigation conduct on a variety of grounds, including but not limited to non-disclosure, late filing of Form E1, not complying with directions, forging a document, unsuccessfully applying for MPS and LSPO and unsuccessfully appealing those decisions and seeking to adduce expert evidence on chattel valuations without the court’s permission ([74]). The judge stated that ‘many of these allegations can also be made against F. … It is uncomfortable to hear him complain about the same issue’. As such, no costs order was made against W.

Conduct

F’s allegations of conduct were dismissed:

‘I find it difficult to see how in any Schedule 1 case dealing with the claim of a child that the conduct of one parent to the other could have any bearing on the outcome of that child’s claim, unless that conduct had a bearing on the party’s ability to care for the child and additional expenses were thereby incurred.’ ([27])

Millionaire’s defence

The judge also gave an insightful obiter comment on the use of the millionaire’s defence, often employed by the wealthier party to limit their disclosure obligations:

‘For reasons that I have never understood the millionaire’s defence seems to abrogate the requirement of the respondent to set out his or her budget. It seems to me that it would be helpful for the richer party to produce a budget to avoid protracted argument about standard of living.’ [57]