In this article I shall refer to those financial remedy cases heard in private to which s 12 Administration of Justice Act 1960 does not apply as mainstream financial remedy cases. As is well-known, s 12 imposes an automatic restriction on publishing the details of any financial remedy case which is mainly about child maintenance. The great majority of financial remedy cases are not protected by s 12.

In ‘Multiplied Propagation’ (8 April 2024)1 I analysed 24 mainstream financial remedy cases placed on Bailii/TNA in the 6 months from 30 September 2023 to 31 March 2024. Of these, 23 were published anonymously. Of those, only two gave a reason for anonymisation but in neither was there anything to suggest that a proper In re S (A Child) [2004] UKHL 47, [2005] 1 AC 593 balancing exercise was undertaken, or that a reporting restriction order had been made under s 11 Contempt of Court Act 1981. None of the other 21 judgments gave any reasons for anonymisation. Of those 21 judgments, seven had no rubric, leaving the reader entirely at sea as regards their reportability. The other 14 bore the standard rubric but without any explanation why it had been applied, whether the Re S exercise had been undertaken, or if a reporting restriction order (RRO) had been made. I concluded that none of the 23 judgments complied with the law. I said that ‘they show that desert island syndrome is not merely alive and well but is positively thriving and going from strength to strength’.

I have now undertaken the same exercise for 60 judgments placed on Bailii/TNA in the year 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025. Apart from two, these were all mainstream financial remedy cases. One was a contempt hearing which should have been heard in open court (No 3) but where the report does not say if it was. The other (No 32) was a Schedule 1 case covered by s 12 where the respondent was a famous footballer, Kyle Walker. It is included because the court exceptionally applied the open justice principle to its judgment.

Of the 60 cases, 12 were published using the parties’ names, although some of these had partial anonymity imposed and 48 were anonymised.

This data shows that in terms of respect for the open justice principle things have generally gone from bad to worse, although a very recent development might suggest that if the tide is not turning, it may be reaching its peak.

Before I embark on the analysis, I set out again as shortly as possible the applicable principles. I have stated them many times before, but until recently it felt as though I was having a conversation with myself in an empty room.

Subject to statutory exceptions, the open justice principle applies as forcefully in the Family Court as it does in other courts: it is not ‘another country’ (Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417; Tickle v BBC [2025] EWCA Civ 42 at [46] per Sir Geoffrey Vos MR).

Mainstream financial remedy cases are heard in private in the Family Court (FPR 27.10), although the press and bloggers may attend (FPR 27.11). The general rule is that it is not a contempt to publish information relating to such proceedings merely because the case was heard in private (Scott v Scott, passim; Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post and Echo Newspapers Plc & Ors [1991] 2 AC 370 at 416 per Lord Bridge). A non-section 12 hearing in private does not cloak the proceedings in secrecy; it is merely a convenient way of conducting the hearing (Scott v Scott [1912] P 241 at 271 per Fletcher Moulton LJ: ‘[the rule] provides for privacy at the hearing. It has nothing to do with secrecy as to the facts of the case’). Journalists and bloggers who attend a mainstream financial remedy hearing held in private may publish anything they hear in that hearing, unless the court has made an RRO.

There are two types of anonymity order. There is the bare type which does no more than to withhold a name or names from the public. I shall refer to such an order as ‘a withholding order’. The power to make such an order is an aspect of the court’s general power to regulate its procedure. A withholding order does not, by itself, prohibit the publication of the withheld names or any other details regarding the proceedings (PMC v A Local Health Board [2024] EWHC 2969 (KB) at [47]–[50] per Nicklin J).

It is because such orders are toothless that the second type of anonymity order is normally used. It is framed as a form of RRO, breach of which would amount to a contempt. I shall refer to such an order as ‘an anonymity RRO’.

Any kind of formal RRO must be made pursuant to an identified Act of Parliament. Neither the procedural rules nor the common law empowers such an order to be made; the power to make such an order must be found in legislation (Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd [2017] UKSC 49, [2019] AC 161 at [16]–[18] per Lord Sumption; Independent Publishing Co Ltd v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2004] UKPC 26, [2005] 1 AC 190 at [67] per Lord Brown: ‘if the court is to have the power to make orders against the public at large it must be conferred by legislation; it cannot be found in the common law’).

Contrary to popular belief, in a mainstream financial remedy case that power will not normally be found in s 11 Contempt of Court Act 1981. Section 11 does not itself confer a free-standing power to grant an RRO. The power to do so is contingent upon the court having first, or at least simultaneously, made a withholding order. Once a court has withheld the name or information, s 11 provides an ancillary statutory power to impose an RRO which then prohibits publication of the withheld name or information (In re Guardian News and Media Ltd [2010] UKSC 1, [2010] 2 AC 697 at [31]; A v BBC [2014] UKSC 25, [2015] AC 588 at [59]). Clearly, the withholding and penal aspects can be conflated into one order. But if the names sought to be withheld have been used in proceedings in court or otherwise published by the court (e.g. in court lists or documents relating to the proceedings made available to non-parties), then there is no jurisdiction to make an order under s 11 (R v Arundel Justices ex parte Westminster Press Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 708 at 710H–711; PMC at [63]).

In every one of the 48 cases where anonymity was imposed the names would have been used in court, so s 11 would not be available.

In those cases attended by journalists or bloggers governed by the Transparency Reporting Pilot for Financial Remedy Proceedings (the Transparency Pilot)2 – which now encompasses the entire country (see below) – it is inconceivable that the parties’ names will not have been mentioned in court or otherwise publicly referred to by the time that the court comes to ‘consider’ making a transparency order. Indeed, para 12 of the Pilot Guidance states: ‘Cause lists for all FRC Courts, including cases heard at the Royal Courts of Justice, will name the parties and state that the proceedings involve financial remedies’.

Therefore, s 11 will not usually be available to make an order under para 19 of the Guidance. The only other statutory power which can be invoked to make such a ‘transparency order’ would be s 6 Human Rights Act 1998 which makes it unlawful for a court, as a public authority, to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. That provision could allow a contra mundum injunction under s 37 Senior Courts Act 1981 to be made to protect the Article 8 Convention rights to a private and family life. Per Nicklin J in PMC at [92]:

‘an injunction under s.37, the purpose of which is to impose reporting restrictions, should only be granted if the applicant satisfies the Court (a) that there is no other jurisdiction available under which the Court can grant the reporting restriction sought; and (b) by clear and cogent evidence, that, without the order being made, the Court will be in breach of the duty not to act incompatibly with a Convention right under s.6 Human Rights Act 1998; and (c) that the In re S parallel analysis leads to the conclusion that such an order should be granted.’

For the reasons given above, it is very unlikely that in a mainstream financial remedy case the statutory power will be s 11. But even if it were, there would still have to be an application, supported by clear and cogent evidence, subjected to the full Re S balancing exercise undertaken very carefully and not casually or mechanistically. But if, as would seem to be much more likely, the statutory source is the Convention, then in addition to these requirements the court has to be satisfied that were the order not made, it would be in breach of the duty not to act incompatibly with a Convention right under s 6 Human Rights Act 1998. That is a high hurdle indeed and cannot be surmounted simply by affixing a rubric to the front of a judgment.

Thus, where the court is considering making a wide-ranging ‘transparency order’ under para 19 of the Pilot Guidance it should have in mind these severe limits to its jurisdiction, and where it has jurisdiction, on the exceptional nature of the relief sought and the clarity and cogency of the evidence needed to justify it.

My problem with the section in the Guidance headed Transparency Order (paras 19–25, and Annex II which provides the template for a final order) is that nowhere does it identify what power the court is exercising when it makes such an order. In contrast, a standard civil anonymity order will state on its face that it is made pursuant to s 6 Human Rights Act 1998, s 11 Contempt of Court Act 1981 and CPR 5.4C, 5.4D and 39.2(4). In PMC at [155] Nicklin J observed that the reference to CPR 39.2(4) was wrong and stated:

‘The order should identify the correct statutory basis for the reporting restriction (not least so that it can be readily ascertained whether the restriction is automatically time limited – e.g. under s.39 Children & Young Persons Act 1933). The order should set out clearly what cannot be published. The terms of a reporting restriction, if made under s.11 Contempt of Court Act 1981, will closely mirror the information which the Court has directed must be withheld from the public. The order should also state for how long the restrictions are to last.’

In Rosemin-Culligan v Culligan (Re Costs and Anonymity) [2025] EWFC 26 at [41] MacDonald J correctly stated:

‘The jurisdictional foundation on which the Court rests its decision whether to anonymise a judgment is s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.’

For the reasons I have given that is almost invariably going to be the case. Therefore, any final transparency order made pursuant to the Guidance has to be based on clear and cogent evidence that satisfies the requisite standards. None of this is recognised in the Guidance or in Annex II.

The Guidance states categorically at para 8 that it will adopt the recommendations contained within the report of HHJ Farquhar’s group. In para 7 it records the main recommendation of the group that:

‘In any case attended by a reporter, a Reporting Order should be made entitling the reporter to see the ES1 and position statements of the parties, and setting out what reporting is permitted in the case, whilst preserving the anonymity of the parties, and the confidentiality of their most private details. The suggested 2 core principles are that a reporter should be permitted to publish information relating to the proceedings save for the following:

• The names and addresses of the parties (including any intervenors) and their children and any photographs of them;
• The identity of any school attended by a child of the family;
• The identity of the employers, the name of the business or the place of work of any of the parties;
• The address of any real property owned by the parties;
• The identity of any account or investment held by the parties;
• The identity of any private company or partnership in which any party has an interest;
• The name and address of any witness or of any other person referred to in the hearing save for an expert witness.

This is not a ‘transparency’ order. On the contrary it is a comprehensive, fierce, anonymity RRO. Although the Guidance says at para 19 that when a reporter attends ‘the Court will consider making a standard Transparency Order in accordance with Annexe II’, paras 7 and 8 can only mean that such consideration should normally result in the order being made. As shown above, this scheme imposes far greater secrecy on a mainstream financial remedy case than hitherto. How is this standardised anonymity reconcilable with the general rule in Pickering? Or with the ordinary rule in Re S? How can it co-exist with the balancing exercise mandated for the individual case in Re S? How can the court follow this Guidance simultaneously with Lord Neuberger’s Practice Guidance [2012] 1 WLR 1003 which insists that anonymity orders can only be made exceptionally – when it is ‘strictly necessary and only to that extent’?

One has to ask: If they were alive now, how would Lord Shaw and Lord Moulton describe the constitutionality of this scheme?

It will no doubt be said that the court has not got time when hearing a difficult case to jump through all these hoops. In such circumstances, the court can make a very short-term interim anonymity RRO to hold the ring pending a final decision on anonymity, for which purpose it does not need to have the clear and cogent evidence or to have undertaken the Re S balancing exercise needed for a final order: R (Marandi) v Westminster Magistrates Court [2023] EWHC 587 (Admin) at [82].

In the light of these observations, I regretfully conclude that in not one of the 48 cases where the judgment was published anonymously did the court effectively prohibit anybody from publishing anything in the judgment or from revealing the parties’ identities. In none of the cases was there an application for an RRO identifying the statutory source of the power; nor was there any clear and cogent evidence justifying why anonymity was exceptionally necessary and explaining how, if the order were not made, the court would be in breach of its s 6 duty; nor was there any finding to that end. Apart from those five cases where a perfunctory and wholly inadequate balancing exercise was performed, there was in each of those 36 cases only a rubric by way of explanation and in seven cases nothing at all.

In contrast to the cases analysed in my previous article, the cases this time round display a bewildering variety of rubrics. Twelve different rubrics were used in an attempt to impose anonymity. They are set out in the Annex to this article. There are eight variants of the standard rubric. In six of them, the user has changed ‘may be in contempt’ to ‘will be in contempt’ – from mere possibility to certainty – a significant alteration in modality.

HHJ Hess used no fewer than five variants when seeking to impose anonymity (No 6 – variant 4; No 17 – variant 6; No 18 – variant 5; Nos 44 and 47 – variant 7; and No 49 – variant 8) and in four of them made that modal change.

Regardless of such changes, none of these rubrics achieves enforceable anonymity. If someone publicly identified the parties in one of these cases, they could not be held to be in contempt of court. These rubrics are, with respect, worthless bloviations which should be abandoned forthwith.

Mainstream financial remedy judgments can of course be published with redactions. That may prevent the redacted information being discovered. However, such redactions will not prevent the information being publicly revealed, perfectly lawfully, if it can be discovered. Only an anonymity RRO can prevent that. A rubric, even a rubric using a modal verb threatening a finding of contempt, does not and cannot act as some kind of proxy for an anonymity RRO.

Consider Rubric Variant 2 used in Case No 2 in the table below. It is not merely minatory in tone. It contains an explicit command that the anonymity of the parties and their children must be strictly preserved. This edict must be complied with by the whole world, including all arms of the media, without limit of time. It ends with an explicit threat – a breach will be (not may be) a contempt of court. Anyone reading the rubric who did not understand the law would think that they would face penal consequences if they breached such a fierce command.

Mrs Scott was not just threatened, but actually charged, with contempt for breaching a comparably worthless secrecy edict. Lord Shaw of Dunfermline at 476 saw this not only as ‘an encroachment upon and suppression of private right’ but as ‘the gradual invasion and undermining of constitutional security’. Under our constitution everyone is under the law; and the court is the guardian and enforcer of the law. I agree with Lord Shaw that for the court knowingly to bandy about such worthless nonsense undermines the very foundations of our constitutional security.

In the KBD, a party will make a decision right at the start of the case whether to seek anonymity and if so, will make the necessary application. If granted, the anonymity RRO is placed on the judiciary website, so that there is complete transparency about which cases have been made secret.

I now turn to the 60 cases which are tabulated as follows:

Of the 48 anonymised judgments:

• Twenty-seven bore the standard rubric but gave no explanation for its imposition. Of these, three were disputes about status (Nos 7, 11, 19) which on any view should have been heard in open court as being governed by Part 7 or being analogous to such business.
• Nine bore variants of the standard rubric (Nos 1, 2, 5, 6, 17, 18, 44, 47, 49), suggesting that the judge made the positive decision to alter the default wording provided by the judicial judgment generator, but still gave no explanation for its imposition.
• Seven were anonymised but bore no rubric prohibiting identification of the parties or family members (Nos 14, 35, 36, 37, 45, 46, 59). It is assumed that in these cases the court was not seeking to impose any kind of enforceable secrecy on the judgment.
• In only five (Nos 4, 15, 16, 19, 53) was a form of balancing exercise carried out. In each case the exercise was perfunctory and wholly inadequate. None identified any of the requirements or necessary findings for making an effective reporting restriction order.

Of the 12 non-anonymised judgments:

• One was a contempt case arising out of FR proceedings (No 3).
• Two actually used the standard rubric but nonetheless named the parties (Nos 27 and 39). The former was a decision of Cusworth J. The latter was a judgment summons which according to the rubric was decided in private. These are virtually impossible to understand.
• Four had been previously reported using the parties’ names (Nos 29, 30, 54 and 55).
• Three were reported openly without any dispute (Nos 8, 41, 56).

Only two gave rise to a contest about anonymity which was resolved in favour of openness (Nos 32 and 52). The former was a Schedule 1 case covered by s 12 where the respondent was a famous footballer, Kyle Walker. In that case different considerations applied to those in a mainstream financial remedy case as there were automatic statutory reporting restrictions which had to be disapplied. The decision of HHJ Hess to publish the judgment only redacted in the most minor degree is much to be applauded.

It is astonishing that in the year there was only one mainstream financial remedy case where the court properly applied the law in favour of openness: Rosemin-Culligan v Culligan [2025] EWFC 1 and [2025] EWFC 26. Whether this heralds a turning of the tide remains to be seen. One can only hope.

Contrary to what the Master of the Rolls said in the Tickle case the Family Court is, sadly, ‘another country’ when it comes to the application of the open justice principle. That was described by Scarman LJ in In re F [1977] Fam 58 as our equivalent of the First Amendment to the US Constitution. That great judge ranked the principle as one of the most important in our constitution, yet the family judiciary seems largely blind to it.

In his second judgment in Rosemin-Culligan v Culligan MacDonald J was faced with an argument by counsel for the secrecy-seeking wife that the question should be approached in accordance with the provisions of the Transparency Pilot. In a curious numbers game, she also relied on statistics showing that of 44 published cases heard in the Family Division or Family Court in November 2024 in only three were the parties named, and none was a financial remedy case. Further, of 38 published cases thus heard in December 2024, in only one, a financial remedy case, were the parties named, and that had been the subject of been extensive press coverage. These arguments got nowhere. MacDonald J at [39]–[42] held:

‘39. Ms Faggionato’s diligent and detailed survey of the naming conventions applied to recent published decisions in the Family Division and Family Court (which, it might be said, tends to somewhat blur the line between the citation of authority by counsel, which is permitted, and the giving of evidence by counsel, which is not) does not change the position. Indeed, it further emphasises the importance of not taking a blanket approach to the issue of anonymisation based on perceived “policies” and the need to adhere to the principled approach set out above.

40. Each case will turn on the application of that principled approach to the particular facts of the case. As such, to suggest that because a large number of cases are anonymised in any given period all cases should be anonymised is to succumb to a logical and legal fallacy and falls into the very trap that the jurisprudence indeed warns against. …

41. The jurisdictional foundation on which the Court rests its decision whether to anonymise a judgment is s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The process by which it resolves whether to exercise that jurisdiction is having regard to and balancing the interests of the parties and the public as protected by Arts 6, 8 and 10 of the Convention considered in the particular circumstances of the case, being the rights most likely to be engaged in respect of financial remedy proceedings. This is the approach that has been repeatedly confirmed by the higher Courts, even in those authorities that are traditionally cited in opposition to publication, most notably Lykiardopulo v Lykiardopulo and Clibbery v Allan. In the context of the cardinal principle of open justice, in deciding whether to permit anonymisation this is the approach that must be adopted in each case.

42. It is important to be clear that the foregoing authorities, including the decisions of Mostyn J in Xanthopoulos v Rakshina and Re PP (A Child: Anonymisation), do not purport to proscribe a fixed outcome on the question of anonymity in every financial remedies case. Rather, they emphasise in the context of cardinal legal principles of very longstanding that the Court must address the question of anonymity specifically and on a principled basis, applying the test established by the case law to the particular facts of the case. Having undertaken the required balancing exercise in this case, I am not satisfied that there is any justification for anonymising the judgment.’

This judgment appears to accept, implicitly, that the Transparency Pilot is not compliant with the law.

In about 2013 Holman J began hearing every single case in public. Mr Farmer of the Press Association was present at very many of his hearings. Cases not protected by s 12, or by s 97 Children Act 1989, were fully reported. I started publishing unredacted all my judgments in non-protected cases in 2020. Although Holman J and I received submissions that to allow such cases to be published and reported fully would give rise to all manner of perils, no such consequence was ever drawn to our attention. Further, neither of us was ever appealed to the Court of Appeal for doing so. It is impossible to resist the conclusion that opposition to open justice is just a lazy trope which its supporters have been unwilling to put to the test by taking the matter to the Court of Appeal.

The writing of the text above was completed on 5 April 2025. On 11 March 2025 (but not placed on Bailii/TNA until a date after 5 April 2025) Trowell J published his judgment in X v Y [2025] EWHC 727 (Fam). That was a financial remedy appeal where the wife challenged a decision by the first instance judge to refuse to reopen a judgment given on 14 December 2023 which had not been the subject of an order when the husband’s father died on 3 January 2024. Trowell J dismissed the appeal. His judgment does not mention the existence of any minor children, nor does it give any other reason why it should be anonymised. Yet it was anonymised, and prominently displays a modified version of the standard rubric stating:

‘This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.’

The standard rubric has been altered so that ‘may be in contempt’ became ‘will be in contempt’ – mere possibility became certainty – a significant change in modality.

If this were a first instance judgment the usual criticisms would be made. Why is it anonymised? Was an RRO made? If not, what does the rubric mean? But this was an appeal. FPR 30.12A(3)(a) and PD 30B, para 2.1(a) are clear that the court should make an order for the hearing to be in public. While PD 30B, para 2.1(b) then goes on to state that the court should normally impose reporting restrictions in the terms of the standard order located at www.judiciary.uk/publication-jurisdiction/family-2/ (which link does not work), para 2.3 states that in a financial remedy appeal where no minor children are involved, the court will not normally impose reporting restrictions.

So, to be clear, in a financial remedy appeal, where no minor children are ‘involved’ (which must mean that the provision for such children is the subject of the appeal and not merely that that parties have children), the court should ordinarily (and without any application having been made) make an order, without any reporting restrictions, for the appeal to be heard in public. The consequence of such an order would be, to state the obvious, that the judgment would bear no rubric and would not be anonymised.

Thus, for appeals from the Family Court to the High Court we can see that these Rules and these Practice Directions explicitly insist on the application of the open justice principle, a constitutional imperative of the utmost importance. These Rules and these Practice Directions derive their authority directly from Parliament under ss 75–82 Courts Act 2003.

Yet the judgment of Trowell J does not refer to any order made under para 2.1. It does not refer to any children. It does not say that the hearing was in public. It would appear that both counsel, the wife’s solicitor, and the judge collectively overlooked the existence of FPR 30.12A(2) and (3) and PD 30B, paras 2.1–2.3, with the result that the open justice principle was not upheld.

It is extremely dispiriting that time and again such basic errors are still being made.

On 27 January 2025 FPR 12.73A and 14.14A together with PDs 12R and 14G came into force. These converted the Transparency Pilot for public and private law children cases into permanent provisions.

In ‘A View from The President’s Chambers: April 2025’ Sir Andrew McFarlane P stated:

‘As will be well known, on 27 January the “Transparency Pilot” ceased to be a pilot when provision for all Family Court centres to make Reporting Restriction Orders was established as part of normal business by the introduction of Practice Directions PD12R and PD14G. For those courts not previously in the pilot, the change will at first only involve public law and financial remedy cases …’

The reference to financial remedy cases is presumably to the rolling out, as mentioned above, in December 2024 of the Transparency Reporting Pilot For Financial Remedy Proceedings to cover all of England and Wales.3

I respectfully suggest that before the Rule Committee converts that (now national) Pilot to permanency, it very carefully considers the lawfulness of: (a) the Pilot’s terms which impose anonymity routinely in all cases where a reporter attends; (b) the terms of the rubric to be used where a ‘Transparency Order’ is made; and (c) the terms of the rubric to be used where a judgment is to be anonymised.

ANNEX

The standard rubric, created by the judgment generator

‘This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of Court.’ (standard)

Note: sometimes ‘leave’ is manually replaced by ‘permission’.

The recommended rubric in the Transparency Reporting Pilot for Financial Remedy Proceedings

‘This matter was heard in private. The judge gives permission for this version of the judgment to be published. In no report of, or commentary on, the proceedings or this judgment may the parties or their children or their addresses be identified. [In this case a Transparency Order has been made on — — which continues in effect.] All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers must ensure that the terms of this rubric [and the terms of the Transparency Order], are strictly observed. Failure to do so may be a contempt of Court.’ [Adapt as appropriate] (TRP Rubric)

Variants

‘This judgment was delivered in private. The Judge has given permission for this anonymised version of the judgment (and any of the facts and matters contained in it) to be published on condition always that the names and the addresses of the parties and the children must not be published. For the avoidance of doubt, the strict prohibition on publishing the names and addresses of the parties and the children will continue to apply where that information has been obtained by using the contents of this judgment to discover information already in the public domain. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that these conditions are strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of Court.’ (Variant 1)

‘This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published. Nevertheless, the parties and their children must not be identified by name or location. Their anonymity must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of Court.’ (Variant 2)

‘This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of any child and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Unauthorised publication of the judgment will be a contempt of Court. The names of the parties and any children must not be disclosed in public without the Court’s permission.’ (Variant 3)

‘This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published, but no other. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of Court.’ (Variant 4)

‘This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment (but no other) to be published. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of Court.’ (Variant 5)

‘Nobody may be identified by name or location. The anonymity of everyone other than the lawyers must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of Court.’ (Variant 6)

‘This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published, but no other version.’ (Variant 7)

‘The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment (but no other) to be published. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of Court.’ (Variant 8)

Rubrics prohibiting some but not all publication

‘This judgment was delivered in public. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published. The parties can be named as can any other individual not anonymised in this version. On the other hand, those individuals and entities that are anonymised must not be identified by their real names. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of Court.’ (Partial 1)

‘This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the children of the Applicant and First Respondent may not be named. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of Court.’ (Partial 2)

Rubrics allowing full publication

‘This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published.’ (No prohibition)