Collardeau v Fuchs: Contempt of Court [2025] EWFC 413

Judgment date: 28 November 2025

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/2025/413

Poole J. An application for committal to prison for contempt of court following alleged breaches of an order made varying a final financial order.

This is the eighth reported judgment in the lengthy proceedings (both financial remedy and enforcement) between Ms Collardeau and Mr Fuchs.

Background

On 28 March 2025, and in determining an application by Ms Collardeau to vary and enforce the final financial remedy order from June 2023, Mr Justice Poole made orders:

• preventing Mr Fuchs, both personally and as a member of limited liability companies, from disposing of or otherwise dealing with the US Properties, which were defined to include a property known as ML1 (paragraph 9 – the preservation order);
• preventing Mr Fuchs from impeding or interfering with the domestication of any order of ‘this Court’, including where the US Properties are located (paragraph 10).

Th exact wording of the relevant orders can be seen at paragraph 4 of the judgment. A penal notice was attached to the 28 March 2025 order (March order). Mr Fuchs was present at the March hearing as a litigant in person. The March order was served on him by email following the hearing. Earlier in the proceedings, and by her order dated 8 August 2024, Mrs Justice Gwynneth Knowles allowed for service of all documents within the proceedings on Mr Fuchs by email at a defined email address. Mr Fuchs did not argue that the order for alternative service was inherently defective.

The committal application

Ms Collardeau alleged the following breaches of the above orders in her committal application:

• Mr Fuchs sold ML1 on 25 June 2025.
• Mr Fuchs, through his US lawyers, filed documents opposing Ms Collardeau’s application in the US for the domestication of orders made by the Family Court here.

A third breach was pursued by Ms Collardeau and withdrawn at an earlier hearing of her committal application.

Mr Fuchs was not present at this hearing, despite being ordered to attend in person, but he was represented. Breaches of the order were eventually admitted on Mr Fuchs’ behalf, but not contempt of court on the basis that the application for committal was defective due to ineffective service of the March order and because the court did not have the power to make paragraph 10 of the March order.

Service of the March order

In line with FPR 37.4(2) and MBR Acres v Maher & Anor [2022] EWHC 1123 (QB), [2022] 3 WLR 999 (this case is about the equivalent Part 81 of the CPR), an injunction (as contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the March order) needs to be personally served on the defendant, unless the court had otherwise ordered, before a contempt of court application may be filed. In relying on the order of Mrs Justice Gwynneth Knowles which permitted service by email, Ms Collardeau’s position was that there had been effective service of the March order on Mr Fuchs. It was argued unsuccessfully on Mr Fuchs’ behalf that:

• Ahmed v Khan [2022] EWHC 1748 (Fam) created a general rule obliging the court to consider whether personal service should be dispensed with in an alleged contempt application.
• An order for alternative service is only effective in contempt proceedings if it expressly refers to personal service being waived for such an application.

Mr Justice Poole found, beyond reasonable doubt, that Mr Fuchs had a copy of the March order, knew the effect of the preservation order and breached it. In considering sentencing, it was noted that Mr Fuchs had paid the sum of $31m to Ms Collardeau prior to the hearing (November 7), partially satisfying outstanding court orders. A further $10m had also been paid by Mr Fuchs by the time of the judgment (November 28), but there were disputed concerns about whether third parties might be able to make claims against the later payment. Sentencing was adjourned until January/February 2026, subject to judicial availability, providing Mr Fuchs with an opportunity to outline the effects of his payments and to show how Ms Collardeau had not been disadvantaged by the sale of ML1.

Mr Justice Poole also considered that if he was incorrect about effective service of the March order by email, that the court can retrospectively permit alternative forms of service even in a contempt of court application. In summary:

• Failure to personally serve an injunctive order for which a breach is alleged to be a contempt of court is a procedural defect in the ‘commencement or conduct’ of a contempt application, which according to FPR PD 37A paragraph (2) can be remedied if the court is satisfied ‘that no injustice has been caused to the defendant by the defect*’*.
• If service by email was initially defective, Mr Justice Poole would have deemed service by email to be effective as Mr Fuchs was present when the March order was made, it was discussed with him, a breach was admitted, Mr Fuchs did not suggest he was not aware of the March order, and there is no injustice to him by the personal service requirement being waived.

Ultra vires nature of paragraph 10

Mr Justice Poole found that paragraph 10 of the March order was too wide, that the court ‘very arguably’ acted beyond its power and the consequence of the order was not explained to Mr Fuchs at the March hearing. No findings of contempt were made on this basis. Mr Justice Poole also suggested that paragraph 10 should have included the words ‘save on the ground of lawful cause within proceedings’.