CC v UU [2025] EWFC 214

Judgment date: 17 June 2025

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/2025/214

Peel J. Application by W for an LSPO following final financial remedy order dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction under s 22ZA MCA 1973 after a clean break.

Background and procedural history

The parties divorced, with Decree Absolute pronounced on 8 December 2023; [15]. On 11 December 2023, DJ Barry made a final FR order, providing for equal division of the proceeds of sale of the mortgage-free FMH, declining a pension sharing order, and imposing a clean break; [15], [17]. The Wife (W) did not attend, having been refused an adjournment.

Thereafter, W issued or sought to issue multiple applications. These included an application to set aside the final order, applications for freezing injunctions, and appeals against refusals of interim injunctive relief. She also applied for two legal services payment orders (LSPOs) pursuant to s 22ZA of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973). The first was to fund her appeal to the Court of Appeal against the discharge of a freezing order by Williams J. The second was to support a proposed set aside application; [9], [13].

In this judgment, the court considered only the two LSPO requests before it. The first was subsequently modified during the hearing to a request for adjournment. The second was an oral request for £50,000 in respect of an unissued set aside application. No other matters were determined; [13].

Jurisdiction to grant LSPOs under s 22ZA

Peel J held that jurisdiction to grant an LSPO under s 22ZA is extinguished once a clean break has taken effect and all claims for financial relief have been dismissed; [39], [41]. He observed that s 22ZA applies only to ‘proceedings under this Part for financial relief’, meaning active FR proceedings governed by Part II of the MCA 1973; [37], [40].

Distinguishing Ahmad v Faraj [2025] EWCA Civ 468, where spousal periodical payments were ongoing, and Xanthopoulos v Rakshina [2023] EWFC 158, where a periodical payments order preserved jurisdiction. Peel J found that no such circumstances applied here; [43]–[45].

Accordingly, he concluded there was no jurisdiction to grant an LSPO to support an appeal concerning interim injunctive relief that did not arise from FR proceedings and was unrelated to any pending substantive claim; [46]–[47].

Set aside applications and LSPO jurisdiction

Peel J further held that a set aside application under s 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 and FPR 9.9A is not a proceeding for financial relief under the MCA 1973; [50]. Although such applications must be filed within the proceedings in which the FR order was made per FPR 9.9A(3), this does not render them financial relief proceedings for the purpose of s 22ZA; [51].

He confirmed that an LSPO cannot be granted in support of a set aside application issued long after a clean break, even if the relief ultimately sought is financial in nature; [49], [52].

Strike out risk and procedural observations

W’s set aside application dated 26 June 2025, which repeats arguments from her earlier application dismissed in April 2024, may be liable to strike out as an abuse of process under FPR 4.4(1)(b); [35]. Peel J distinguished this from M v B [2025] EWFC 182 and Roocroft v Ball [2016] EWCA Civ 1009, which addressed first applications rather than repeated litigation; [35].

He also rejected W’s proposal to have her set aside application heard in London, reaffirming the requirement that such applications be heard in the court that made the original order (FPR PD 9A, para 13.3); [36].

Conclusion

The court dismissed both LSPO applications for want of jurisdiction; [55]. The set aside application is to be determined by the Newport Family Court; [56].