AN v NT [2025] EWFC 456

Judgment date: 19 December 2025

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/2025/456

Peel J. How can a party obtain without-notice injunctive relief pending leave under Part III MFPA 1984 following Potanina v Potanin?

Overview

W applied simultaneously, without notice, for: (i) leave under Part III and (ii) a restriction against the FMH under s 46 LRA 2002. Peel J reiterated that, post-Potanina, leave applications should ordinarily be dealt with on notice. As leave is a pre-condition of s 23 MFPA 1984 relief, Peel J considered alternative routes to securing interim protection.

Background

H and W (both aged 50), Russian nationals, married in 2003 and have two sons (22 and 17). They moved to England in 2007 and separated in 2018.

The family home was a property in central London purchased during the marriage. Upon separation W received an eviction notice and moved into another London flat owned by H.

Shortly after separation the parties reached a financial settlement and divorced in Russia. They agreed that under Russian proceedings, only Russian property would be dealt with.

What followed was lengthy contested proceedings in the Russian courts as to the extent of the property in Russia. The broad terms of the financial agreement were as follows:

1. Sale of the London property – W to receive 40% of the proceeds or £2m.
2. H to pay outgoings on any property bought by W until the children attainted 21.
3. W to retain the Moscow family property.
4. H to pay W maintenance to a total of £17,000 pcm until her remarriage, plus child maintenance, education costs and property outgoings.
5. H to pay W a lump sum of $1m.
6. W to receive 20% of all trust assets which was anticipated to be between $8m–$20m.

The settlement was undermined by litigation concerning misappropriated trust assets. The trustee was eventually convicted of fraud and imprisoned; insurance recovery failed. In the meantime, H transferred Russian and Cypriot assets from the trusts into his own structure. As a result, W received little of the settlement and was in a very financially precarious situation. She alleged H maintained a lavish millionaire lifestyle.

The applications

In August 2025 W applied for the following orders:

1. Permission to apply for financial relief following an overseas divorce under s 13, Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984.
2. A restriction to be entered against the London property occupied by W, but owned by H, under s 46 of the Land Registration Act 2002.

W sought the applications on a without notice basis due to her concerns that H would evict her and the youngest son from the property.

The law

Peel J reiterated the law post Potanina v Potanin [2024] UKSC 3 as follows:

• There is no requirement for a party applying to set aside an order made without notice to demonstrate a ‘knockout blow’ or a compelling reason why it should be set aside or that the court was materially misled.
• Thus, where leave is granted on a without notice basis the matter will essentially be heard as a re-hearing with a fresh consideration of the merits; the onus remains on the applicant to justify leave.

Section 23(2) MFPA 1984 enables the court to make orders to (i) prevent parties from dealing with/dissipating assets and (ii) set aside any reviewable dispositions. Crucially, these orders can only be made after leave is granted.

Peel J considered that there were three alternative options pending leave:

1. Freezing injunction under s 37 Senior Courts Act 1981.
2. Where it relates to tangible property – an order under FPR 20.2(1)(c)(ii) for the preservation of tangible property (which would likely be considered under the principles in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] UKHL 1).
3. An order for a restriction over property under s 46(1) Land Registration Act 2002.

Judgment

W’s leave application should have been made on notice; therefore, her application was adjourned to an on-notice hearing.

An order was made under s 46 LRA 2002 to preserve the property where W was living in the interim period. Peel J considered this to be appropriate given W’s financial insecurity and the history (on her case) of assets being misappropriated, particularly in respect of the former family home in London which had been stripped of its equity.