Rt. Hon. The Countess Karen Anne Spencer v Rt. Hon. Ninth Earl Spencer, Charles Edward Maurice Spencer [2025] EWFC 431

Judgment date: 8 December 2025

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/2025/431

Peel J. Appeal by W for further details of an arbitration award to be disclosed to the associated King’s Bench Division proceedings and to ‘any persons’. Peel J permitted minimal further disclosure in order to provide the King’s Bench court with full context but ultimately emphasised the private and confidential nature of arbitration.

Background: the arbitration award

In 2024, the parties had agreed by an ARB1FS to have their financial proceedings determined by arbitration; [2]. H’s (domestic) partner, Professor Cat Jarman, had then instituted proceedings in the King’s Bench Division, alleging that W misused Jarman’s personal information; [3]. W had denied the allegations. Jarman had made a without prejudice save as to costs offer and then a Part 36 offer; [3].

The arbitrator, James Ewins KC, had included in the arbitration award a schedule of matters agreed between the parties which included:

1. permission to disclose particular paragraphs to W and Jarman’s respective media lawyers; and
2. [at para 104.5 of the award] permission to apply to him to disclose the paragraphs in the King’s Bench proceedings [4].

Permission was later granted for the paragraphs to be disclosed to H’s media lawyer; [8].

The arbitrator, having seen both of Jarman’s offers but without referencing their contents in his award, had stated that he expected W to accept the Part 36 offer; [6]. This was on the working assumption that acceptance could occur without W’s admission of unlawful conduct; [6]. Acceptance would be conditional upon H indemnifying W for sums required to satisfy its terms, as well as for her legal costs incurred in the King’s Bench proceedings; [6].

W’s media lawyers had requested reconsideration on the ground that whilst acceptance of an offer was not an acceptance of liability, it risked appearing as such through any statement in open court (‘SIOC’); [7]. The arbitrator had declined to reconsider it, as it did not amount to clarification under s 57 of the Arbitration Act 1996, but had added that the paragraphs of the arbitration award authorised for disclosure would enable the King’s Bench judge to comprehend the context of W’s acceptance of the WP offer; [8]. W had accepted the Part 36 offer; [9].

W and Jarman had not agreed the SIOC; [12]. Jarman had applied to the King’s Bench division for an SIOC prepared by her to be read out in court; [12]. W intended to seek the judge’s refusal to approve Jarman’s SIOC on the grounds that it was neither fair nor proportionate; [12]. A direction had been made for W to produce evidence in response to Jarman’s SIOC application; [12].

The instant case

W applied for authorisation for disclosure of further details of the arbitration processes, specifically:

1. disclosure of an email from the arbitrator;
2. disclosure of the full award and other material to W’s media lawyers; and
3. permission for W to use, if not details of the whole award, then at least the initially approved paragraphs to ‘defend her reputation’ in the media; [14].

The legal principles

Peel J noted that:

1. Arbitration proceedings are typically private and confidential, per Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2008] Civ 184; [16].
2. That Article 16.1 of the Family Law Arbitration Scheme Arbitration Rules provides that disclosure is permissible only if necessary to effect an award; [17].
3. That the general principle is not absolute, with exceptions indicated at [107] of Emmott. These exceptions include: with the express or implied consent of parties; where the court has given permission; where it is reasonably necessary to protect legitimate interests, public interests or the interests of justice; [18].

Peel J accepted that W’s Article 6 rights (right to fair trial), Article 8 rights (protection of personal reputation) and Article 10 rights (freedom of expression) were engaged; [19]. H’s rights per Articles 6 and 8 were also engaged; [19]. None takes precedence over the other, per Re S (A Child) [2005] 1 AC 593 [17]; [19].

W submitted, per Blunkett v Quinn [2005] 1 FLR 648 [22], that correcting false impressions will help to secure Article 6 and 8 rights; [20]. She also relied upon Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Times Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 2705 (QB) and Toulson and Phipps on Confidentiality (4th ed); [20].

The balance of fairness

Peel J noted material factors for H. These included that the authorised disclosure was sufficient to provide context to the King’s Bench court and that the fundamental assumption of privacy and confidentiality risked being undermined; [22].

The material factors for W included that the King’s Bench proceedings had an impact upon her finances, and that disclosure was directly relevant to conclude the litigation between W and Jarman; [23].

Judgment

Peel J noted that the authorised disclosure was proportionate given W’s Part 36 acceptance, but that to allow disclosure that was not ‘obviously necessary’ would ‘disproportionately invade the essential confidentiality of the arbitration process’; [25]. Articles 6, 8 and 10 had weight concerning the disclosure already authorised by the arbitrator; [26]. Peel J’s decision was reinforced by the fact that the arbitrator had not been invited to adjudicate on the instant matters; [26].

Peel J thereby restricted disclosure to that which the arbitrator had authorised, except that he additionally allowed for paragraph 104.5 as well as extracts from the arbitrator’s email to be disclosed to provide relevant context to the King’s Bench court; [27], [32]. W was permitted to disclose the whole of the award to her media lawyers, that they might represent her fully; [37]. Peel J did not deem it appropriate for the contents of the award or the authorised disclosure to be revealed to ‘any persons’, reiterating the confidentiality of arbitration; [36].

Peel J made no order as to the costs of and occasioned by the instant hearing, except where they were within the scope of the arbitrator’s award; [42].