KMR v AER [2026] EWFC 10 (B)

Judgment date: 15 January 2026

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/b/2026/10

DDJ Benjamin Rose. Judgment considering high-value assets, non-disclosure, jurisdictional questions, issues surrounding the validity of a nuptial settlement and general conduct of proceedings.

Background and proceedings

The applicant wife was 55 years old. The respondent was 53 years old. There are two children of the family, A and B, aged 16 and 13 respectively who live with W in a rented property in London. W had not been employed since the birth of the children. Before that, she worked in investments, with an annual salary of US$1 million.

H was also residing in a rented property in London. And worked as a commodities trader, being employed by or holding office in several entities. His annual income was difficult to establish. The chronology of proceedings ran to 14 sides of typed A4, of which all but nine lines detailed the failures of the respondent to comply with court orders.

The judge was asked to deal with the following matters:

i) The true extent of the assets;

ii) The validity of an alleged nuptial agreement between the parties, and the applicable jurisdiction

iii) W’s interest in family trusts set up in New York by her parents

On the first day of the five-day final hearing, H sought an adjournment to prepare his case, despite having been legally represented until days prior; and applied for relief from sanctions in respect of his failure to prepare a s 25 statement. Pursuant to Lieven J’s ruling in TRC v NS [2024] EWHC 80 (Fam) and considering the application of Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906 and Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKCS 12, DDJ Rose determined there was no good reason for exercising discretion in favour of H. The applications were dismissed.

Nuptial agreement

Held, with regard to Re: Annesley [1926] Ch 692, that the domicile and shared common intention of the parties was London. The laws of England were therefore both the lex domicilii and the lex forti. The applicable law as governing the agreement was therefore Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42.

However, W explicitly denied signing any form of nuptial agreement. The court found that, not only was the purported ante-nuptial agreement a falsehood, but that ‘it was created by the respondent or on his behalf, with the intention of misleading the applicant and this court’; [78].

The assets

W’s evidence was that the New York trusts set up by her parents were created for tax efficient holdings and essentially constituted a living will that does not bind the survivor in terms of distribution. Her evidence was supported by the opinion of the New York attorney responsible for drafting the Trust documents.

W disclosed debts of £1,205,366.00, with soft debts supported by agreements and payment requests per P v Q (Financial Remedies) [2022] EWFC B9. H disclosed debts of £378,172.00, with the court finding hard debts of only £72,353.00.

H made a number of arguments in relation to the assets, including that many assets were non-matrimonial and ought not to be considered. He had not fully disclosed his business interests until he was cross-examined, and the court found that even then there were deviations from the established paper evidence. The court also had to determine the value of an art collection.

H’s evidence was ‘haphazard, wooly, and lacked definition’. He was asked ‘pointed and direct questions’ about his compliance with orders, the timing, dates and locations of events and he ‘could not answer them candidly’; [26]. His evidence on the valuation of his business interests and art collection was ‘at times farcical’ [27] and he agreed in his evidence to frustrating the sale of many pieces of the art collection, including in contravention of court orders.

Needs

DDJ Rose found that the applicant would be able to obtain work, but it would be ‘plainly unrealistic’ to suggest she would be able to resurrect her investment banking career; [64]. In contrast, the court found the respondent’s disclosure of £89,789 was ‘significantly under declaring his income’ considering his equity rights in share dividends; [65].

On housing needs, the judge considered that the children had lived their entire lives with their mother. The respondent had made no child arrangements application and had, at the time of the hearing, accrued arrears in maintenance and school costs totaling £780,000. Both parties were in rented accommodation meeting their needs; both parties would need to purchase a stable home, mortgage free from the marital assets, for the benefit of the children.

Conduct

DDJ Rose considered the s 25 checklist with reference to White v White [2001] 1 AC 596 and Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26. The judge considered the conduct of the parties, under s 25(2)(g), with reference to the comments of Peel J in Tsvetkov v Khayrova [2023] EWFC 130 at [40] and with consideration of the conduct types as articulated by Mostyn J in OG v AG [2020] EWFC 52 at [35].

Offers had not been exchanged, with the judge finding this was due to ‘the wholesale failure to comply with the disclosure directions by the respondent’; [69].

DDJ Rose found that personal economic misconduct and the add-back jurisdiction did apply. Having considered the effect of the purported nuptial agreement, DDJ Rose considered, on a ‘ballpark figure’ there was a marital pot of £6,840,013.50. The judge further considered that based upon the ‘material non-disclosure by the respondent’ [79] he was entitled to make an inference that ‘[H’s] needs can be met by his undisclosed assets’ [79], per Moylan LJ in Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482 at [87]–[90].

H’s litigation misconduct, as is usual, was dealt with separately in costs. So too was the ‘clear and wanton elements of non-disclosure and deceit in the fact of the court’ [100], which had increased W’s costs and were dealt with accordingly.

Conclusion

W had made an offer, the effect of which was that the entirety of the art collection was to be transferred to her to be sold providing a housing fund with a cap of £1.75m. Any surplus was to be credited against a lump sum of £1.75m, with interest accruing. Payment was to be made for any arrears of maintenance and LSO and any outstanding costs orders. Further provisions included apportionment of the respondent’s business interests, and payment of maintenance and school fees for the benefit of the children. Thereafter there to be a clean break; [70].

DDJ Rose made an order almost entirely in the terms of W’s offer. The judge gave a housing cap of £1.5m and a lump sum of £1m. The terms in respect of the apportionment of business assets and the payment of child maintenance and schooling costs were left unchanged, as were the provisions for payment of arrears and costs orders.

Permission to appeal

The respondent sought permission to appeal ‘on several points of the judgment such as the valuations of the art, valuations of the business, the qualification of some assets as matrimonial or non-matrimonial, disclosure and conduct. (quoted verbatim and in full)’ [116]. Leave to appeal was refused on the basis that (a) the matters raised are determinations of fact and (b) there is no prospect of success upon the grounds of appeal.

This judgment has not been certified as citeable pursuant to the Practice Note (Citation of Cases: Restrictions and Rules) [2001] 1 WLR 1001.