K v K [2026] EWFC 83 (B)

Judgment date: 9 March 2026

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/b/2026/83

DJ Parker’s decision emphasises the importance of the court transcript where there is a dispute as to what was said by the judge. Ultimately H’s application to set aside a final order by consent failed because H was wrong; the FDR judge had not given him a 28-day cooling off period.

Background

H’s application to set aside a final order (by consent) was reached at an FDR and approved by the judge.

H and W had been married for 12 years. There were two minor children (aged 9 and 2 years) who had no contact with H. At FDR agreement was reached, and the consent order of 1 April 2025 was approved by the court.

H applied to set aside the 1 April 2025 consent order. H asserted that he was informed by the judge that he had 28 days to change his mind in relation to the terms of that order. H also asserted: (i) lack of litigation capacity/vulnerability arising from ADHD; and (ii) unfairness arising from the fact he is homeless and that there had been financial coercive control, lack of representation, as well as non-disclosure. At an earlier hearing, District Judge Parker declined to dismiss the application and, giving H the benefit of the doubt, directed that the FDR transcript be obtained.

Outcome

At [41]–[57], DJ Parker sets out the law relevant to the court’s broad jurisdiction to set aside orders, albeit that a court cannot revisit a final order as a substitute for an appeal. DJ Parker was satisfied that the court must be extremely cautious in exercising its apparently broad and unfettered power under this provision and would need to take into account a wide range of factors in considering an application to vary or revoke an order; [46]. These factors included whether there had been a material change of circumstances, a misstatement of the factual basis of the original decision, a manifest judicial error, or material non‑disclosure; [47].

The judge considered the evidence before him, and he was not satisfied that there was sufficient evidence that H lacked capacity. He noted that all court hearings create anxiety and strong emotions, but it does not necessarily follow that litigants have a right to have an order set aside simply because, upon reflection in the ‘cold light of day’, they wish to reconsider matters; [62].

The transcript demonstrated that no 28‑day cooling‑off period had been granted; [63]; H’s application therefore failed; [64].

This judgment has not been certified as citable pursuant to the Practice Note (Citation of Cases: Restrictions and Rules) [2001] 1 WLR 1001.