BS v HC [2026] EWFC 20 (B)

Judgment date: 19 January and 3 February 2026

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/b/2026/20

HHJ Hess. Final hearing in financial remedies proceedings. HHJ Hess dealt with questions of ‘matrimonialisation’ surrounding H’s pensions in light of the decision in Standish.

Introduction

A marriage of approximately 15 years from 2009–2024; [7.v]. H had four adult children from his first marriage, and there were no children of the marriage; [7.iv]. The parties had lived in a flat owned by W’s father from 2009–2014, and H continued to use the property when working in London until 2018; [7.iii]. They paid no rent for this property; [7.iii]. W allowed H’s son from his first marriage to live in the property for two years, also without paying rent; [7.iii]. The parties held two properties in joint names; [7.i], [7.iii].

Computation

The asset schedule was almost entirely agreed, with the only computational dispute being W’s arguments for add-backs totalling £102,330 arising out of payments made by H to his adult children; [13]. W contended that the payments should be added back to H’s column on the asset schedule because it would unfairly manipulate the situation if the mathematical effect of his non-consensual gifts was that that she had to pay for half; [14]. H submitted that add-backs should be permitted only where dissipations are wanton or reckless and where the spending was deliberately targeted towards diminishing the share of a party (per Norris v Norris [2002] EWHC 296, Vaughan v Vaughan [2007] EWCA Civ 1085 and MAP v MFP [2015] EWHC 627); [15]. H submitted that the payments reflected his wish to help his children, and that if they amounted to an add-back then they should be weighed against W’s high degree of reciprocal spending across the previous year; [15]. HHJ Hess concluded that W’s spending had the effect of ‘neutralising’ H’s own ‘close to the line’ payments and decided not to make any add-backs; [16].

HHJ Hess included H’s CGT debt figure but did not include his accountancy fee debts; [17].

Sharing: non-pension assets

The parties accepted that the sharing principle should apply to the non-pension assets; [19]. HHJ Hess noted the relevant case law, namely White v White [2000] UKHL 54 and Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24. HHJ Hess determined that sharing would be best achieved by transferring one property to W and the other to H, with balancing sum of £724,654 from H to W; [20]. Such a division would enable H to choose whether to retain or to sell the property allocated to him; [20].

Pensions and ‘matrimonialisation’

H had pensions of substantial value, whilst W had pensions of limited value; [22]. A Single Joint Expert had been instructed; [24]. Whether H’s pensions should be regarded as matrimonial property (and thus subject to sharing) was disputed; [23]. This raised the issues: (1) whether the pensions should have been treated as having accrued outside the marriage (2009–2024); and (2) whether the portion accrued outside of the marriage (before 2009) should be treated as having been matrimonialised; [23].

HHJ Hess considered Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26; [25], [32]. He also considered the issue of ‘apportionment’, as discussed in the Pension Advisory Group’s 2024 PAG2 report, noting the methodologies of ‘the deferred pension method’, ‘the CE method’ and the ‘Straight Line Method’; [26]. W submitted that attention should be focused upon the results of the CE approach, whilst H submitted that the results of the ‘service approach’ (similar to the ‘deferred pension method’) should be foregrounded; [28], [29].

HHJ Hess noted Hart v Hart [2017] EWCA Civ 1306, specifically Moylan LJ’s statement that, where a clear mathematical demarcation line cannot be found, ‘the court does not have to apply any particular mathematical or other specific methodology’, as well as that ‘[t]he court has a discretion’ and that ‘fairness has a broad horizon’; [30]. HHJ Hess concluded that the pension issue ‘should not solely be answered by reference to one mathematical analysis’; [31].

W had submitted that her contributions to the marriage (such as mingling of a £1,500,000 gift from her father into the matrimonial pot and allowing free use of his London property from 2009–2020) should be given weight; [33]. However, HHJ Hess also noted H’s substantial contributions, and ultimately reiterated Coleridge J’s warning in G v G [2002] EWHC 1339 (Fam) about a ‘rummage in the attic’; [33].

HHJ Hess pointed out that ‘[r]ights in a pension, unlike cash or property, rarely become ‘mingled’ during a marriage’; [34]. Whilst H had submitted that because the pension funds were untouched, they could not meet the Standish test of ‘actual use and enjoyment’, HHJ Hess concluded that ‘this is too literal an interpretation’; [34]. While actual use and enjoyment provides an example, so too could a common intention to put the asset into use and enjoyment in the future, if that intention was relied upon by the other party to his or her detriment. W relied on a conversation from 2013, during which she had agreed for one of their properties to be purchased in joint names using the £1,500,000 from her father, on the basis of H’s statement to the effect that ‘we will share everything equally’; [35]. HHJ Hess determined that more would be required to meet the Standish test; [35]; the conversation was not necessarily about pensions.

Weighing all of the above matters, HHJ Hess concluded that it was fair to regard 55% of the husband’s pensions as having accrued during the marriage and 45% as having accrued outside the marriage. Applying sharing, this translated to a pension sharing order of 27.5% of H’s Quilter SIPP; [36].

Needs

W argued that she could make a needs claim exceeding the sharing claim; [38].

HHJ Hess, considering the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, the ages of the parties, the duration of the marriage and their respective contributions, concluded that W’s reasonable housing needs were met by her remaining in the property allocated to her; [39]. He did not accept F’s argument that W should have to downsize her accommodation; [39].

Given W’s age, health issues, the fact that she hadn’t worked for over a decade and H’s retirement, HHJ Hess determined that ‘it is reasonable to assume that she will have no earned income in the future’; [40]. She would therefore have to take her pension income straight away; [41]. She was given a ‘small cushion of cash’, resulting in a Duxbury fund of about £375,000; [42]. HHJ Hess concluded that her reasonable spending needs were between £60,000–£65,000 per annum, which broadly matched the income she would receive on HHJ Hess’s sharing basis calculations; [43].

Order

HHJ Hess decided to adopt the sharing basis result; [43]. Therefore: one property would be transferred to W; the other property would go to H; a lump sum of £724,654 would be paid from H to W; there would be a pension sharing order for 27.5% of H’s Quilter SIP, with W covering 27.5% of the pension sharing charges; and, otherwise, a clean break; [45].

Costs

HHJ Hess noted the costs of the parties (totalling nearly £600,000), emphasising that it was ‘unfortunate’ that two ‘intelligent, respectable and pleasant’ parties could not have resolved the case at an ‘earlier stage’; [3].

Both counsel made submissions on costs following the judgment. HHJ Hess decided to make no order as to costs, acknowledging FPR Part 28; [51].

This judgment has been certified as citeable pursuant to the Practice Note (Citation of Cases: Restrictions and Rules) [2001] 1 WLR 1001.