Introduction

It is approaching 10 years since HHJ Edward Hess and Joanna Miles published their seminal article which fired the starting gun for the creation of the Financial Remedies Court (FRC).[[1]] Much has happened in the intervening years. The purpose of this article is to reflect upon the possible ways in which the FRC might evolve and develop in the future.

With the tantalising possibility of cohabitation reform on the horizon,[[2]] we suggest that this is an opportune moment to reflect on the issue of the status and jurisdiction of the court itself, not only for a new breed of cohabitation claims but also for claims brought pursuant to the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TLATA 1996) and claims under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (I(PFD)A 1975). There have been calls for years, including from senior members of the judiciary, for modest statutory reform to remedy the Family Court’s current, and what we and many others consider to be, erroneous lack of a TLATA 1996 and I(PFD)A 1975 jurisdiction.[[3]]

Possible options for further evolution of the FRC

In contemplating how the FRC might evolve, we consider three broad areas, grouped into issues related to jurisdiction, organisation and digitisation.

Jurisdiction

In the second instalment of Sir James Munby’s article about the origins of the FRC, he recounts what he regards as an oversight in the primary legislation which created the Family Court; that claims pursuant to TLATA 1996 and I(PFD)A 1975 cannot presently be heard there and, instead, cases are confined to the High Court and the county court.

It has been suggested that a simple amendment to s 23(3) TLATA 1996 and s 25(1) I(PFD)A 1975, adding the words ‘or the Family Court’ would resolve this issue. This amendment was identified and recommended by Sir Michael Briggs (as he then was) in his report on civil justice reform[[4]] and has been noted as a ‘simple’ remedy to address this issue by Sir James Munby.[[5]]

In the following discussion, we reflect on an existing debate concerning an expansion of jurisdiction, considering the issue of whether the Family Division should, in respect of High Court level I(PFD)A 1975 claims, have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction with the Chancery Division. We review that debate, and the policy choices made to date, in light of the advent of the FRC and the possibility of a new breed of claim based upon the parties’ cohabitation.

Furthermore, we suggest that in line with the recommendations of the Law Commission in their 2007 report on cohabitation, the anticipated forum for all cohabitation disputes should be the Family Court, in the form of the FRC.[[6]]

There is a long-standing and ongoing debate as to where I(PFD)A 1975 cases should be heard when allocated at High Court Judge level. This debate provides illumination concerning a future enlarged role for the FRC.

The 1974 Law Commission Second Report on Family Property: Family Provision on Death stated:

‘[251] At present jurisdiction in the High Court under the 1938 Act [a precursor to I(PFD)A 1975 for claimants who were married] is exercised by the Chancery Division whereas that under the 1965 Act [a precursor to I(PFD)A 1975 for claimants who were divorced] is exercised by the Family Division. This can lead to the result that a divorced wife must apply in one Division whereas her children must apply in another, and that former wife must apply in one Division and the widow in another. Although it is possible for an application to be transferred from one Division of the High Court to another, so all applications can be heard together, it would be simpler if all applications had to be made in the same Division.’

The Law Commission went on to suggest that the ‘jurisdictions are essentially the same and should be administered by the same Division’.[[7]] Whilst the vast majority of those who responded to the Law Commission’s working paper accepted this point, only a small number expressed strong opposition to the proposal. This included responses which considered that jurisdiction should be transferred to the Chancery Division.[[8]] Despite these arguments, the Law Commission concluded that they were in favour of assigning all family proceedings in the High Court to a single division and that this should be the Family Division.[[9]] Whilst appreciating the arguments and considerations of those in opposition to the proposal, including those in favour of allocating all I(PFD)A 1975 cases to the Chancery Division, the Law Commission responded as follows:

‘[255] … Our main reason for our view that the business should be assigned to the Family Division is a reason of principle, viz. that it seems to us that the question of family provision is essentially a family matter. The principal issue is whether the deceased has fulfilled his family obligations to make reasonable provision for his dependants; this issue is one appropriate for the Family Division. The questions for determination, though different, are closely analogous to those arising under Part II of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and under our proposals are indeed expressly linked with those questions … It appears to us that the Division which has the responsibility for administering the 1973 Act is the Division to which questions of family provision should most properly be assigned. We are fortified in our view by the great majority of the those who commented on this aspect of our working paper. There may be circumstances where it would be appropriate to transfer an application for hearing to the Chancery Division, for example, where the application is likely to be affected by the result of a construction summons pending in that Division. Machinery already exists for such transfers and should be retained.’

Notwithstanding this clear and considered recommendation, the views of the Law Commission were not taken forward in this respect. With the passage of time, it is difficult to discern the precise reasons, but the publicly stated rationale can be found in a statement given in the House of Commons by Mr Peter Archer, then Solicitor General (later Lord Archer of Sandwell) on 16 July 1975:

‘The Law Commission recommended that all this work should be brought into one division—the Family Division. My noble and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor has considered this recommendation carefully. He has consulted a number of those who are best qualified to advise, and he believes that the best solution would be to leave the matter out of the Bill. The intention is to provide for it by rules of court. However, the intention is that the rules of court will not exclude the jurisdiction of one division but continue the concurrent jurisdiction of both divisions in such a way that it will be open to an applicant to choose which is the more convenient division for a particular purpose. It is hoped in that way that the anomalies will be ended while the possible advantages of having two divisions will not be lost.’[[10]]

It is something of shame, given the strong consensus before the Law Commission, that the Solicitor General did not elucidate further on who the Lord Chancellor had consulted with and why they were ‘best qualified to advise’. We are somewhat at a loss as to how this, we contend, wrong turn was taken.

Academic commentary has also considered this issue. Following an analysis of judgments from both the Family and Chancery Divisions, Cownie and Bradney argued that each Division has developed a distinctive jurisprudential approach under the I(PFD)A 1975. Through this analysis, they argued that there is a discernible difference in the language used in the judgments of the two Divisions, with this language affecting how applicants are viewed and sometimes the outcomes of cases. All law may look the same, but they suggest that ‘whilst Divisions might be heard to speak with different voices, they speak not separate languages, but different dialects’.[[11]] They concluded that it would be better if exclusive jurisdiction was exercised by one Division:

‘The subtle distinction in the two jurisprudences of the Divisions that we have outlined above results not from the use of different lines of authority in the traditional doctrinal sense but, rather, from the fact that there are different topoi[[[12]]] “dialectical and rhetorical proofs that reasons from generally accepted opinions and arguments” in the two Divisions. These topoi, “endowed with conviction power, not with truth power”, “are fragmentary insights, points of view, that orient the discussion of the problem and open a set of possible solutions.” In the Family Division the elusive nature of relationships is a topos; in the Chancery Division their determinability is equally a topos. For Tyler, this is the “looser language” of the Family Division. In reality, however, this is a different form of rhetoric suited to a different set of concerns. When this is allied to a tendency to choose different legal points of reference for analogy and metaphor when constructing an argument and a disparity of experience with the form of law that the Act takes, a different jurisprudence results. The result of variation is that there is necessarily an element of injustice in the treatment of some individual litigants. The forum for the hearing of their case, not simply the legal rules applicable, is part of that which determines who wins and who loses.’[[13]]

Cownie and Bradney’s analysis of the jurisprudential distinction between the two Divisions is supported by the dicta of Briggs J (as he then was) in the Chancery case of Lilleyman v Lilleyman.[[14]] In this case, he notes the potential difficulties for a Chancery judge in applying family law principles, particularly if they are not the ‘bread and butter of his daily fare’.[[15]]

We suggest that there is a policy choice to be made as to where family property and family provision disputes are heard. If the TLATA 1996 and I(PFD)A 1975 Family Court anomaly is corrected – with a minor tweak to the legislation in a Cohabitation Bill – the question remains as to how should the business be allocated? On this point, we rely on the views of the Law Commission and suggest that family disputes should be heard in family courts.

In the 2007 Law Commission report on cohabitation, the question of allocation arose in respect of the Commission’s then proposal for cohabitation reform. In the initial Consultation Paper which led to the final report, it was suggested by the Law Commission that claims under a new scheme for cohabitants should be treated as family, rather than civil, proceedings. Cases would then be heard by family judges which, in High Court cases, would be the Family Division.[[16]] The underpinning rationale for this approach focused on the nature of claims arising from a new cohabitation law, the need for expertise in dealing with these claims, as well as the requirement to avoid duplication of work:

‘4.112 The CP’s [Consultation Report’s] primary concern was that procedure under a new scheme should be governed by the Family Proceedings Rules. It highlighted the overriding objective of those Rules to deal with ancillary relief cases justly, and more specifically: to ensure that parties are on an equal footing; to save expense; to deal with the case proportionately; to ensure that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly; and to allot to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources. The CP argued that a claim under the new scheme would place similar demands on the court. The family courts’ practices with regard to case management, the disclosure of financial information, the admission of evidence, the valuation of assets, opportunities for diversion to mediation, the use of first appointments and financial dispute resolution hearings, and their general informality, would be entirely appropriate for a new scheme of financial relief operating between cohabitants.

4.113 The CP also referred to the unnecessary duplication of work that can currently arise when family disputes form the subject matter of several different cases heard in different courts. It suggested that, in the event that a new scheme were introduced for separating cohabitants, there would be many cases where an applicant would bring proceedings for relief under both the separation scheme and under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989, and such proceedings should be joined and heard together. Were there to be a concurrent jurisdiction for a number of Divisions, there would be similar risks of duplication of work. In addition, there would be a danger of the different Divisions developing diverging interpretations of the scheme, thereby complicating matters for litigants.’

To this, we would suggest that the Family Court, in the form of the FRC, is often called upon to deal with cases which rival the complexity of Business and Property Courts type disputes. In fact, looking back at one of the original reasons for the creation of the FRC, Hess and Miles suggested that it was to enable specialisation of the judiciary to deal with ‘this specialist, technical jurisdiction’.[[17]]

The ‘which court, which action’ practitioner debates which currently prevail in central London, when there are competing Schedule 1 (Family Court) and TLATA 1996 claims (county court) and the duplication of litigation and costs is a real procedural quagmire. In central London, the Central Family Court cannot exercise a county court jurisdiction; and the Central London County Court cannot exercise a family jurisdiction. Outside London, most court centres have judges ticketed to sit in both the family and county court and so files from the separate proceedings can be heard at the same time by one judge. This is not possible in central London.

This speaks to the need for family disputes of this type – where there is any case of familial or personal relationship breakdown – to be heard in one court and, for the reasons outlined above, we argue this should be the Family Court, particularly so if there are children arising out of the relationship. This will prevent the need for competing proceedings in different courts arising out of the same relationship breakdown matrix.

Additionally, in the event of a new breed of cohabitation claim, there will no doubt be cases where the dispute will involve third parties who will seek to intervene to establish a separate proprietary claim to a property which is the subject of the claim between the former intimate parties to the main claim. The ability of the Family Court to exercise both the cohabitation claim and separate TLATA 1996 claim as the same time will prevent further bifurcation of proceedings.

Such developments may result in the need for further consideration of the transparency of proceedings and published decisions in the FRC, particularly in light of the calls for more transparency, with the naming of parties in financial remedy published judgments.[[18]] It might be considered illogical to have some private hearings (e.g. financial remedy) and then some open hearings (e.g. TLATA 1996) within the same court. The issue of transparency might also be leveraged to encourage a higher adoption of non-court dispute resolution (NCDR), for appropriate cases.

Organisational issues: structure, the judiciary and court fees

Structure

If an expanded jurisdiction as part of cohabitation reform is on the horizon, we suggest that it provides a timely opportunity to consider and review a number of organisational issues, including the original ambitions for the structure of the FRC.

The model adopted has been to have multiple FRC zones throughout England and Wales, with most zones having two ‘hubs’ with a lead FRC judge per zone. London, by contrast, has a more centralised structure with a ‘single hub’ leadership structure, presided over by HHJ Hess (who is also the deputy lead judge for the FRC nationally).

Many early decisions were made pre-COVID-19. This included the decision not to adopt a single ‘hearing centre’ for each FRC zone, where a FRC judge might have to travel within a larger single ‘hub zone’. The seismic changes wrought by COVID-19 and the need/ability to be able to operate remotely (where it is appropriate to do so) have, we suggest, given opportunity for reconsideration of the original organisational model.

We contend that the ‘single hub’ centre, as exemplified by the London FRC, is a model which has a record of efficiency and success. It has enabled a deep pocket of judicial expertise and excellence to be developed, beyond the High Court, with the lead FRC judge having an exclusively financial remedies related list. This structure has also contributed to notable improvements in efficiency.[[19]]

We therefore raise the question as to whether the ‘single hub’ model would allow for other circuit judges beyond London to operate a list comparable to HHJ Hess’s in the Central Family Court’s FRC? We suggest that, too often, lead FRC judges in courts outside London cannot be devoted solely to FRC business, thereby diluting the aim of judicial specialisation and technical expertise that was at the heart of the original proposals when creating the FRC.[[20]]

The centralisation of FRC administration per circuit may also provide for more flexible judicial deployment, albeit sometimes remotely. A judge sitting in Court X whose FRC list has gone short may be able to assist the overworked judge sitting in Court Y – but in order to do so a more centralised administration would probably be required.

The role of the judiciary in an enhanced FRC

Following on from this structural question is the linked point as to how the FRC might evolve from a judicial perspective. In particular, the need for additional money specialists at the circuit judge level, as well as the judiciary’s role in relation to NCDR.

With an enhanced TLATA 1996, I(PFD)A 1975 and cohabitation claims jurisdiction, FRC judicial resource implications would need consideration. Whilst a detailed empirical breakdown of potential workflow through an enhanced-jurisdiction FRC is a topic beyond the scope of this article, going forward it will be a key issue which will underpin discussion about future reforms in this area.

At this juncture, however, it is important to flag the potential need for additional money specialists within the FRC, particularly if any structural reform is undertaken. With the increasing specialisation of FRC work, as well as a possible enhanced jurisdiction, the question is raised as to whether it remains sustainable to hope that financial remedies practitioners (often well-paid conducting private FDRs and arbitrations, alongside more traditional advocacy and advice) will continue to seek appointment to the circuit Bench on the basis that they will be required to overwhelmingly hear public law children cases? With the increasing specialisation of the Bar, it is rare indeed to find a contemporary practitioner whose practice straddles both money and public children law.

Instead, we suggest that with an enhanced TLATA 1996, I(PFD)A 1975 and cohabitation claims jurisdiction, the FRC might justify more money-only circuit judge appointment competitions throughout England and Wales, possibly predicated on the single hub model as exemplified by the London FRC.[[21]] Such figures might occupy an analogous status to that currently occupied by the specialist Chancery judges in the regional cities of England and Wales.

Furthermore, in light of the continuing focus on NCDR across all forms of private family law,[[22]] a related question is raised as to whether it may be useful to allocate an enhanced role to FRC judges in supporting and supervising NCDR? In particular, whether more can be done to help promote NCDR within the court’s financial remedies process? Would a regular ‘NCDR list’ assist parties seeking to avoid end-to-end litigation where an ‘NCDR judge’ could swiftly deliberate on, for example, issues of disclosure, mode and timing of NCDR and, importantly, timely management, approval and/or enforcement of arbitral awards?[[23]]

Given the oppositional elements to financial hearings, judges can be thought of as umpires over an adversarial fight. However, an NCDR judge, having particular expertise in dispute resolution and appropriate time allocated to them to perform the role, could concentrate on breaking-up the adversarial fights before they require a full-time umpire. We suggest that fast-tracked access to the court, if sought to deal with issues which will permit NCDR to proceed, may enhance the current lacklustre approach (anecdotally, on both sides of the Bench) to NCDR in some quarters. A nascent blueprint for such fast-tracked access can be found in S v P (Settlement by Collaborative Law Process).[[24]]

Court fees

A further possible way in which the FRC might evolve is in relation to the current fee structure. With the court estate feeling like it is running perilously close to ruin, long waiting lists and the court services in need of further investment, a graduated fee structure might be considered. In particular, in light of cases in the higher courts where contested proceedings may last days or even weeks of a High Court judge’s time at the final hearing stage, we think it is important to ask whether the current fixed fee is either fair or progressive.

Fees could perhaps be calibrated by reference to a simple formula which takes into account the scale of the assets under consideration and/or the judicial time required to resolve the dispute. The fee structure could also be designed to promote NCDR, with a relatively modest issue fee but higher FDR and final hearing fees in appropriate cases. A judge at a First Appointment could allocate a case to a particular track, say an express, standard, complex or complex-high value track, with graduated fees for hearings in cases where there is the money to do so and, as we note below, where domestic abuse considerations have been evaluated. An appropriately calibrated FDR fee and a final hearing fee might also encourage some to consider a PFDR or arbitration, thereby preserving precious court time for those cases which have no other options or must otherwise be heard in a court of law. The First Appointment could also include more determined triaging into NCDR, where it is appropriate to do so.

In particular, it is noticeable that there is currently a fee differential gulf between the fees for civil damages claims and financial remedy claims. Civil claims for damages have a fee structure of 5% of the claim amount between £10,000 and £200,000, with a maximum of £10,000 for claims exceeding £200,000,[[25]] whilst, at the time of writing, it costs £313 to issue a contested claim for financial remedies in the Family Court.[[26]] Whether you are a pauper or a prince (or, indeed, an oligarch), have a complex set of assets, or those that are relatively straightforward to navigate, £313 is all you are asked to pay for three court hearings irrespective of their length.

Research undertaken as part of the Farquhar Report,[[27]] found that almost two-thirds of cases (63.1%) for financial remedy judges over a 2-week period in August 2021 (531 cases) involved net assets – including pensions – of less than £500,000. Over 40% involved assets – including pensions – of less than £250,000.[[28]]

For the vast majority of financial remedy cases at the lower-to-mid asset level, we suggest that this fee level is appropriate and that for all modest value cases, the fee should remain at its current level. We are not suggesting that any higher fee would or should apply to these types of claims. Furthermore, in light of the express financial remedy procedure pilot which aims to provide a streamlined process for lower value financial remedy cases for parties with combined net assets worth less than £250,000 (not including pensions), we suggest that it feels like an appropriate moment to open up discussion as to the future fee levels for cases within these different FRC pathways.

Nevertheless, we need to be mindful about access to justice issues in any discussion of the potential reform of fee structures. This requires careful reflection. Findings from the Fair Shares report highlight the importance of the formal legal system for survivors of domestic abuse, and in particular survivors’ significant use of formal legal processes.[[29]] In light of these findings, we need to be alive to the need to protect victims/survivors of abuse and how any change and possible increase to the fee structure should not be a means to prevent a vulnerable person’s ability to apply to court and the need for judicial intervention in their case.

Digitisation

In this section, we contend that the future of the FRC does not lie in PDFs but in the management of digital data. The portal is, in one sense, electronic. Whilst there is always room for improvement, the financial remedy portal has been ground-breaking in moving an entire court work stream to be entirely paperless.[[30]] Viewed from another perspective, however, the hosting of PDF documents on the portal is rooted in an analogue age, simply mimicking paper files, rather than the more contemporary management of digital information. Despite the Reform Programme, which was unprecedented in scale and scope, issues relating to data collection and extraction were not properly considered. Mr Justice Peel, lamenting on the lack of accessible data has commented, extra-judicially:

‘But we know next to nothing, beyond anecdotally, about (1) the quantum of assets and income across the board; (2) the number of children and their ages; (3) whether parties have new partners; (4) the level of costs incurred; (5) whether a clean break is ordered, and so on. Armed with this information, I am confident that detailed analysis would confirm or explode preconceptions which we all have about the financial remedies system. To take one example: If we knew the costs incurred in every case, we would be better placed to evaluate whether the excessive and disproportionate costs seen in the High Court, and criticised by judges at that level, is as much an issue in the courts below. With this sort of information, Parliament, rule makers, judges and HMCTS alike would be better placed to make informed decisions about policy, law and practice.’[[31]]

As a consequence, we suggest that the serious policy question here is when digitisation will happen, not should it happen. The nettle has to be grasped sooner or later.

The vehicle through which this might be achieved is the Online Procedure Rule Committee (OPRC).[[32]] Financial remedy claims are one of the initial areas where the OPRC has been granted jurisdiction to provide for procedural rules.[[33]] This is in addition to the pre-existing Family Procedure Rule Committee jurisdiction.

One major benefit of the improved collection and management of digital data is that the resulting data has the potential to become a large and useful dataset. Sir James Munby records in the second instalment of his ‘Origins’ article the stalled collaboration between the Law Commission and the FRC judiciary about the harvesting of data from financial remedy claims.[[34]] This project started with much optimism about the possibility of generating a data set which would yield statistically vital information on a number of fronts. Properly executed, the real but largely anecdotal concern about regional variations in outcome could be better understood.[[35]] It would also provide a foundation for the future possibility of artificial intelligence triage as to range of outcome. Sir James records the increasingly disappointed utterances of Sir Nicholas Mostyn in successive annual forewords to At A Glance, as the project stalled and then went into deep hibernation.[[36]] Mr Justice Peel comments:[[37]]

‘HMCTS has confirmed that it is able, from a technical perspective, to harvest the wealth of valuable information on the Form D81 (lodged for every consent order). What is needed is commitment and funding to make it happen. I am confident that data of this sort, properly analysed, would in the long run reap considerable savings, and I hope that this valuable project will receive the support it needs.’

Caroline Bowden has set out a compelling argument that the current key financial remedy forms were all created at different times/eras and by different committees. She suggests that little thought has been given to how they might ‘hang together’ and how data might easily travel between them.[[38]]

As a potential solution to this criticism, we suggest that the harmonised digitisation of Forms E, ES2 and D81 are the foundations of a digital future for the FRC. If data is entered into a Form E it should be able to auto-populate ES2 and/or D81 with that same data. At present, the same data is asked for several times, all asking basically the same questions, but presenting in different formats which do not travel easily into the next document.

Additionally, Form P (pension inquiry form) is outdated (last updated in 2011).[[39]] Once modernised it could join the suite of key digital forms.

If key documents in the financial remedy process (e.g. Forms E, ES2 and D81, as well as, potentially, a fully modernised Form P) were aligned so that data could easily travel between them, it would become possible to revive the Law Commission 2020 project to harvest data from financial remedy claims. This would set the foundations for a future where specialist researchers would be able to analyse the dataset and potentially provide indications as to range of outcomes.[[40]] Eventually, it is conceivable that, upon the completion of a digital disclosure process, the system may be able to offer a no-obligation artificial intelligence triage as to range of outcome.

We appreciate that a digital future for justice will not only require significant investment and are cognisant of the pressures on the public purse, but also that recent history with the Reform Programme has not been an unalloyed success.[[41]]

Final thoughts

With the real possibility of cohabitation reform on the horizon, there will be the opportunity for family law to be debated at some length in Parliament. The modest amendments to TLATA 1996 and I(PFD)A 1975 could conveniently be part of a wider package of reforms, which would have at their forefront the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court for cohabitation claims.

In the event of such potential reform, consideration will also need to be given, whether in rules or statute, to the allocation of business for these other family property/provision type disputes. The potential end point could be an enhanced FRC which would be dedicated to this specialism. With other structural refinements to the FRC, which we have briefly posited, there could then flourish more ‘beacon centres’ of excellence for the FRC, beyond London.

Appendix

Position in 2019

Source: Report of the Farquhar Committee (Part 2) (published in 2021) and A Review of the Operation of the London Financial Remedies Court (published in 2022).

Position in year to June 2025

Source: Financial Remedy HMCTS Dashboard Financial Remedy Contested Timeliness on Core Case Data.

[[1]]: E Hess and J Miles, ‘The recognition of money work as a speciality in the family courts by the creation of a national network of Financial Remedies Units’ [2016] Fam Law 1335 (Hess and Miles). For a comprehensive account as to how the FRC was created and developed, see Sir James Munby, ‘The Origins of the Financial Remedies Court – an Insider’s View, Part 1’ [2022] 1 FRJ 19 and ‘The Origins of the Financial Remedies Court – an Insider’s View, Part 2’ [2022] 2 FRJ 127 (Sir James Munby, 2022, Part 2).

[[2]]: See Labour manifesto (2024) where it pledged to strengthen the ‘rights and protections of women in co-habiting couples’, and confirmation by the government in February 2025 that it will consult on the issue later this year (https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/46636/documents/238516/default/).

[[3]]: Sir James Munby, ‘View from the President’s Chambers (17)’ [2017] Fam Law 607, Sir Andrew McFarlane, ‘Message from the President of the Family Division: The Financial Remedies Courts’, 24 February 2021 [2021] Fam Law 469. See also HHJ Evans-Gordon, N Allen KC and R Taylor, ‘The Jurisdiction of the Family Court to Determine Property Disputes in Favour of Third Parties’ [2023] 3 FRJ 192.

[[4]]: Lord Justice Briggs, Civil Courts Structure Review: Final Report (2016), at 11.4 and 11.5. Available at: www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/civil-courts-structure-review-final-report/

[[5]]: Sir James Munby, ‘View from the President’s Chambers, (17)’ [2017] Fam Law 607.

[[6]]: Law Commission, Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown (2007) (Law Commission, 2007), at 4.110–4.119. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/cohabitation-the-financial-consequences-of-relationship-breakdown

[[7]]: Law Commission, Second Report on Family Property: Family Provision on Death (1974), para 252 (Law Commission, 1974).

[[8]]: Law Commission, 1974, at para 253.

[[9]]: Law Commission, 1974, at para 254.

[[10]]: Hansard, 16 July 1975, vol 895, col 1685.

[[11]]: F Cownie and A Bradney, ‘Divided justice, different voices: Inheritance and family provision’ (2003) 23 Legal Studies 566 at 573 (Cownie and Bradney).

[[12]]: I.e. methods of categorising and developing arguments.

[[13]]: Cownie and Bradney, at 580. See also, C John and A Mehta, in ‘Bad Behaviour and Broken Bonds: A Comparison of Conduct in 1973 and 1975 Act Claims’ [2025] 2 FRJ 161 where the differing approaches to the issue of ‘conduct’ under the respective Acts is explored and contrasted.

[[14]]: Lilleyman v Lilleyman [2012] EWHC 821 (Ch).

[[15]]: Lilleyman, [45].

[[16]]: Law Commission, 2007, at para 4.111.

[[17]]: Hess and Miles, at 1335.

[[18]]: Sir Nicholas Mostyn, ‘A Priceless Inheritance: Family Law, Open Justice and the Rule of Law’. Available at: https://financialremediesjournal.com/a-priceless-inheritance-family-law-open-justice-and-the-rule-of-law/

[[19]]: See the Appendix. The authors are grateful to HHJ Edward Hess for supplying the statistics in the Appendix tables.

[[20]]: See Hess and Miles.

[[21]]: The last money-only Judicial Appointments Commission competition was in 2014, for a post in Birmingham.

[[22]]: See, for example, the Family Procedure (Amendment No 2) Rules 2023 (SI 2023/1324). For background discussion, see N Allen KC, R Taylor and A Day, ‘Financial Dispute Revolution? The Family Procedure (Amendment No 2) Rules 2023’ [2024] 1 FRJ 24.

[[23]]: A successful family arbitration list was launched in Australia in 2020: see, Family Law Practice Direction: Arbitration. Available at: www.fcfcoa.gov.au/fl/pd/fam-arbitration, and The new National Family Law Property Arbitration List. Available at: https://lsj.com.au/articles/the-new-national-family-law-property-arbitration-list/

[[24]]: S v P (Settlement by Collaborative Law Process) [2008] 2 FLR 2040. Whilst we acknowledge the very different political context of Singapore, there are a number of aspects of the Singapore family justice system which appear innovative and well-suited to the needs of divorcing couples, see e.g. S Patel and MJ Yoon, ‘Justice that Heals: Lessons from Singapore’s Family Justice System’ [2025] 2 FRJ 188. Available at: https://financialremediesjournal.com/justice-that-heals-lessons-from-singapores-family-justice-system/

[[25]]: www.gov.uk/court-fees-what-they-are

[[26]]: www.gov.uk/government/publications/fees-in-the-civil-and-family-courts-main-fees-ex50/family-court-fees-ex50 (family).

[[27]]: The Financial Remedies Court – The Way Forward: A Paper to consider changes to the Practices and Procedures in the Financial Remedies Court, FRC, September 2021.

[[28]]: FRC, September 2021, at para 3.25. For further data on the combined wealth by category (non-pension, pension and income) in an older sample of financial remedy cases across four courts in England and Wales, see J Miles and E Hitchings, ‘Financial remedy outcomes on divorce in England and Wales: Not a “meal ticket for life”’ (2018) 32 (1 and 2) Australian Journal of Family Law 43 at Table 3a.

[[29]]: See E Hitchings and C Bryson, Dividing Property and Finances on Divorce: What Happens in Cases Involving Domestic Abuse? (Bristol University, 2024), at Ch 3.

[[30]]: At the time of writing it has been reported that HMCTS may not have been transparent about data glitches in portal systems, see e.g. www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cwye2q00k51o

[[31]]: Mr Justice Peel, ‘The Financial Remedies Court: A Year in Review’ [2023] 3 FRJ 170 at 172 (Mr Justice Peel, 2023).

[[32]]: Chapter 2 of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 created the OPRC, and by the Online Procedure Rules (Specified Proceedings) Regulations 2025 (SI 2025/536), which came into force on 1 May 2025 (Online Procedure Rules Regulations), the OPRC gained jurisdiction to make rules for financial remedy claims. (Rhys Taylor is a member of the Online Procedure Rule Committee, Sub-Committee, and the views expressed in this article are his personal views only.)

[[33]]: Online Procedure Rules Regulations, reg 2(d).

[[34]]: Sir James Munby, 2022, Part 2, at 130.

[[35]]: For research evidence about the regional variations in spousal periodical payments across the entire divorcing population (court and non-court), see E Hitchings and C Bryson, Spousal Maintenance across Regions (Bristol University, 2025).

[[36]]: Sir James Munby, 2022, Part 2, at 130. See also Sir Nicholas Mostyn and Holly Symonds ‘Financial remedies on divorce: a data-driven reform’. Counsel, 10 March 2025. Available at: www.counselmagazine.co.uk/articles/financial-remedies-on-divorce-data-driven-reform, and Law Commission, Financial remedies on divorce and dissolution: A scoping report (2024), at 8.9 and 8.10.

[[37]]: Mr Justice Peel, 2023, at 172.

[[38]]: C Bowden, ‘Standardising Financial Disclosure for Out-of-Court Resolution: Can We Trust the D81?’ [2025] 1 FRJ 61.

[[39]]: See Pension Advisory Group Report (January 2024), Appendix V.31–V.35. Available at: www.judiciary.uk/related-offices-and-bodies/advisory-bodies/family-justice-council/resources-and-guidance/financial-needs/pensions-on-divorce/ and note that the modernisation of Form P is a ‘Tier 3’ item in the Family Procedure Rule Committee’s published June 2025 priorities table, meaning that this topic will be addressed ‘when capacity permits’. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/organisations/family-procedure-rule-committee/about#priorities-table

[[40]]: For discussion of the various approaches to the development of a formula with respect to spousal maintenance, see Law Commission, Financial remedies on divorce and dissolution: A scoping report (2024), at 8.71–8.91.

[[41]]: See the keynote speech given by Sir Ernst Ryder at the UCL ‘The Future of Justice’ Conference on 16 June 2025. Available at www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/files/future-justice-sir-ernest-ryderdocx