Finality and Funding: The Implications of a Clean Break following CC v UU

The judgment of Peel J in CC v UU [2025] EWFC 214 provides a further glimpse of the LSPO regime, and seeks to establish definitively when the opportunity to seek an LSPO ceases. The effect of the judgment is that an LSPO application cannot be made after a clean break has come into effect, even if there are ongoing proceedings relating to an appeal, set aside or enforcement application. As we have previously explored, the LSPO regime is already fraught with issues which put applicants – some of whom are likely vulnerable and/or victims of economic abuse – at a disadvantage. Arguably, although this does not appear to have been the situation in CC v UU itself, the judgment further limits access to justice for potentially vulnerable parties.

Even the dry text of Peel J’s judgment reveals a case of considerable conflict (as illustrated by the fact that the parties’ respective views as to the length of relationship differed by a factor of 300%). W applied on the day to adjourn the December 2023 final hearing and, when refused, failed to attend. The hearing proceeded in her absence to a judgment she did not like. Importantly, the final order was for a clean break.

There followed a plethora of unsuccessful applications by W: she was refused permission to appeal the judge’s refusal to adjourn the final hearing; her application to set aside the final order failed; she was denied permission to appeal the failed set aside application.

Several months later W applied for a freezing injunction in the King’s Bench Division supposedly in connection with a set aside application in the Family Court. The application was transferred to the Family Court where it was rejected. W appealed that refusal to the Court of Appeal; this remained outstanding when the matter reached Peel J. W also applied for a freezing order in the Family Division and obtained an interim order which was discharged on notice three days later. That decision too was the subject of an outstanding application for permission to appeal.

W applied for an LSPO in respect of the two appeals, and her application found its way to Peel J in June this year. He emailed W indicating that the application should be adjourned pending determination of whether she had permission to appeal. In response, W sought an oral hearing and then made a further application to set aside the final order and sought an LSPO in respect of that set application.

With that background, the LSPO application might well have struggled on its merits. However, that was not the basis of its dismissal. Instead, Peel J held that a final clean break order having been made, there were no proceedings in existence that would allow an LSPO to be made.

By s 22ZA(2) MCA 1973 the power to make an LSPO exists ‘in proceedings under this Part for financial relief in connection with proceedings for divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation’. Peel J interpreted the words ‘financial relief’ to encompass all applications for financial provision and property adjustment orders, pension orders, and variation, and held:

‘The starting point, in my judgment, is that a party to divorce proceedings may apply for a LSPO under s 22ZA unless and until he or she is prohibited from doing so by the imposition of a clean break. If a final order has been made, claims have been dismissed, and the proceedings have ended, in my judgment it cannot be that a party may thereafter invoke s 22ZA for an ancillary purpose such as to pursue an appeal, or to seek enforcement, or to set aside.’

Peel J noted that the point at which all claims have been dismissed, and no further LSPO application can be made, will depend on the wording of the final order:

• if the clean break is stated to be ‘except as provided in the order’ then the clean break takes effect on the order coming into effect;
• if the clean break is stated to take effect upon implementation of the order then an LSPO claim can be made until the order has been fully implemented.

He went on to say:

‘In this case, the former wording is contained in the order. A clean break therefore took effect on 8 December 2023. It seems to me that thereafter the Wife was not entitled to make a s 22ZA application.’

The former wording is that used in the standard Financial Remedy order; in light of this judgment, it should arguably be amended, at least to include both options.

Whilst the particular facts of this case will rarely repeat themselves, the judgment has wider practical application. It is worth considering each of the three ‘ancillary purposes’ in turn.

Appeals

Peel J noted that ‘where an appeal is launched, and the original order is stayed pending appeal, then the power to make a s 22ZA order is retained unless and until the stay is lifted’. However, an appellant’s notice does not operate as a stay unless otherwise ordered (FPR 30.8), and litigants without resources acting in person may be unaware of the significance of applying for a stay alongside their appellant’s notice. Nor would this assist anyone appealing out of time against a clean break order, again likely to be those without representation or whose vulnerability renders compliance with strict time limits more challenging.

Set aside

Peel J held that not only was there no jurisdiction to make an LSPO in respect of W’s set aside application as the clean break order had taken effect, but that an LSPO could never be made in respect of a set aside application. He held that ‘a set aside application does not fall within the definition of an order’ in proceedings under this Part for financial relief’ as set aside applications are made under s 31F(6) of the MDPA 1984 not Part II of the MCA 1973; nor are set aside applications ‘intimately connected’ with the financial remedy proceedings. Acknowledging that ‘FPR 9.9A(3) states that a set aside application must be made’ within the proceedings in which the financial remedy order was made’, Peel J dismissed this as an administrative provision related to case numbering which ‘does not elevate the set aside application into an application for financial relief pursuant to which a LSPO can be made’.

Peel J’s consideration of the issue illustrates that there were arguments for an alternative interpretation. A purposive approach may have pointed in the opposite direction to his conclusion. As previously explored, there is already a heightened risk that abusive and controlling behaviour is present in cases involving LSPO applications. Set aside applications are frequently made where fraud or non-disclosure is alleged, scenarios most likely to arise in the context of controlling and abusive relationships. This judgment therefore potentially denies those who have uncovered fraud or non-disclosure after a clean break final order the opportunity of legal assistance in proving their case.

Enforcement

By definition, enforcement applications cannot be made until an order has taken effect. Therefore, where the standard order wording has been used, unless there is an ongoing periodical payments order (which will typically be avoided where possible in cases featuring domestic abuse), an LSPO will not be available to pursue an enforcement application. As with set aside applications, enforcement applications will often need to be made by those who have been subjected to controlling behaviour or who are otherwise vulnerable. Denying them a potential route to legal representation does not further access to justice.

While CC v UU offers clarity on the statutory limits of LSPOs, the implications of the decision suggest a possible disconnect with the practical challenges facing those navigating financial disputes, particularly where economic abuse or power imbalances are present. The key takeaway however will be the need for practitioners to be alert to the implications of the clean break wording in final order.

As a footnote to the multiplicity of applications that the Wife made, one was that the proceedings should not any longer be heard in Wales. The judge, a good unionist, had no truck with this.