Obiter Barder Palaver Makes Matters Harder: Kanabar v Kanabar (Deceased)
[2026] 3 FRJ 242. The case of Kanabar v Kanabar (Deceased) & Anor [2026] EWCA Civ 582 involves, by its ratio, fascinating consideration of an important matter of law.
The case of Kanabar v Kanabar (Deceased) & Anor [2026] EWCA Civ 582 involves, by its ratio, fascinating consideration of an important matter of law.
Considering first the facts, the husband (H) was Dipak Maganal Kanabar. His first wife, Sonal Kanabar (A), to whom he was married in 1999, was the respondent in financial remedy proceedings issued by H in September 2021. This was over 13 years after their separation on a date between 2006 and 2008, and over 10 years after their divorce in November 2010.
H and his second wife, Seema Kanabar (B) married in 2012 and had one daughter, a minor.
At the time of the issue of the financial remedy proceedings between H and A, there were three principal assets, being three properties, all in the same road. The first of these was the former matrimonial home of both H and A, and subsequently of H and B. It had equity of £33,880. The second property was purchased in 1998, so before the relevant marriage, in the joint names of H and his father. It had equity of £132,020. H asserted that there was a life interest settlement, made on 17 March 2005, such that the beneficial interest was held on trust for H’s two brothers. The third property, purchased in 2021, after the end of the marriage, was in H’s sole name, but, H contended, his father provided the funds and was the sole beneficial owner. This had equity of £110,000.
So far, so law school problem.
H’s father was eventually invited to intervene, there having been various issues, including A not complying with directions. Directions required the father to be joined, and for TL v ML [2005] EWHC 2860 (Fam) pleadings if he wished to be joined. A preliminary issue hearing was listed.
The father did confirm he wanted to intervene, but did nothing else. His application to intervene was therefore dismissed, and instead of the preliminary issue hearing that had been pre-emptively listed, a final hearing was substituted, the court recording that the ‘entire position that we find ourselves in today … has been brought about by [H’s] father’. That order was not appealed.
The final hearing therefore took place in November 2023. The court directed that the third property be sold, with A having conduct of the sale and receiving the proceeds, with H paying all the outgoings until sale. H retained the remainder of the assets, including the family home. This judgment therefore gave A £110,000 (being the value of the third property). H retained his interest in the first property, which had an agreed equity of £33,000 and which has been in H’s joint name with A; and the second property, with equity of £132,000, which, as above, H stated was not his. The parties otherwise retained their assets including pensions.
The judgment recorded that District Judge Birk had heard from H’s father as a witness, that she gave little weight to his evidence, and that the question of his beneficial interest was not an issue before the court, as the correct procedure had not been followed.
In terms of other assets, the court found that H had pensions of £177,000 against A’s of £163,000; that savings were modest; that H did not owe his father £98,000; and that H had a net income of £54,700 against A’s of £13,700. A needed a one-bedroom property. H needed a two-bedroom property as he needed to accommodate B and their daughter. H’s need was met in the former matrimonial home.
The court found that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the third property, being in the sole name of H, was his, so added £110,000 to the pot; and in respect of the second property, noted that there had been no intervention in respect of the third property, and, as it was in the legal names of H and his father, attributed to H a half share (£66,000).
As such, the matrimonial pot was £210,000, and A therefore received 55%, to reflect the imbalance in contributions towards the financial burden of their two children.
H appealed.
H contended that the district judge erred:
(1) in refusing to consider the arguments made with respect of the legal or beneficial interests of the second and third properties;
(2) in failing to properly consider whether either the second or the third properties were matrimonial property (even if their beneficial interest did lie with H) prior to division;
(3) in failing to give proper weight to the fact that these parties had separated some 17 years prior to the date of this final hearing, and either the quantification of the matrimonial assets or their division should be reflected to address this issue;
(4) in determining the case solely on the basis of ‘needs’ for A, rather than giving any weight to the other section 25 criteria; and
(5) despite considering the case on the basis of needs, by ending the case in a position where A’s needs were then still not met.
Permission to appeal was granted, with the appeal listed to take place in September 2024.
However, H then died, on 29 July 2024. He died intestate.
The appeal was adjourned and re-listed to take place on 20 March 2025. H’s solicitors, presumably because they realised that they had no one to take instructions from in circumstances in which no grant of letters of administration had been made, asked to come off the record, and also informed the court that they understood that B was to apply for a grant of letters of administration, but had not done so. A’s solicitors opposed a request for an adjournment. The court discharged the solicitors but did not adjourn, inviting B to attend, with or without legal representation. A hearing took place on 20 March 2025, where A was represented by counsel and B attended, unrepresented.
In a reserved judgment handed down on 17 June 2025, the judge considered the procedural issue of there being no personal representative of H’s estate, B having stated that she did not wish to take on the role of personal representative, and nor did anyone else. The judge considered that ‘the absence of a live and active appellant creates a sort of legal limbo’. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Unger v Ul-Hasan (Deceased) [2023] UKSC 22 as authority for the proposition that ‘procedurally financial remedy appeal proceedings survive the death of a party … so long as a suitable representative party is appointed to act on behalf of the estate of any deceased party’.
Faced with this procedural conundrum, the judge considered a number of options – a further adjournment to see if someone took on the role of executor; dismissal of the appeal summarily; strike out under FPR 4.4(1); or strike out under FPR 30.10. Counsel for A had indicated that she was content for the appeal to be determined on its merits. B was of the same view, and that was the course that the judge ultimately took.
The judge focused on the first ground of appeal, noting that the court had a duty, at the computative stage, to determine what issues are in play, and just because a third party was uncooperative, this did not prevent a party from pursuing the point. He held that the appeal succeeded on ground 1 and also on ground 2. The order was set aside, and the court was not in a position to substitute an order, as the judge considered he could not resolve the beneficial ownership disputes. He recognised that, as a result of Unger, this might mean that A could no longer pursue her claim, and suggested she consider other statutory routes, which the Court of Appeal took to mean under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (the 1975 Act) or under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TLATA). They noted that A would not be treated as a spouse under the 1975 Act, given the date of decree absolute.
A appealed on 16 July 2025 and was granted permission. B was joined as a respondent, the court recording that B had now obtained a grant. However, she had in fact not done so but had made an application; there had been no grant. A had obtained a caveat, but it had expired.
The appellant was given permission to appeal on four grounds:
(1) The court erred in not striking out the appeal in circumstances where H had died and none of those who would benefit from the success of the appeal were willing to administer his estate.
(2) The court was wrong to allow the appeal on the basis of assertions of beneficial interest that were improperly pleaded and would inevitably have failed.
(3) The court was wrong to find that the district judge misapplied the law in respect of non-matrimonial property in circumstances where she rightly considered that she had to distribute that property to meet needs.
(4) In the alternative, having allowed the appeal, the court was wrong not to substitute a different order, thereby leaving the appellant with almost nothing from the marriage, and with no clear remedy under the 1975 Act. The court should have made what provision for A it could in the circumstances.
Cobb LJ, in granting appeal, considered that ground 1, which was the focus of the appeal, raised an important point of principle and/or practice, namely what a court should do when an appellant with permission to appeal dies intestate and no person is willing to take a grant or prosecute the appeal. He considered that the hearing of the appeal was arguably irregular, and troubling given the appeal was allowed leaving A with no relief. He directed that the Attorney General appoint an advocate to the court to address the following issues:
(1) What should an appellate court do when the proposed appellant (to whom permission to appeal has been granted) dies intestate, and no person is in a position (or apparently willing) to take out letters of administration and/or is authorised to prosecute the appeal before the appellate court?
(2) Should an appeal, in these circumstances, fail for want of an appellant?
(3) Should the court, in these circumstances, have granted A’s application to strike out H’s appeal:
(a) pursuant to FPR 4.4(1)(b) as an abuse of process because it sought a remedy for a party who has died, and no one else sought to prosecute it on his behalf?;
(b) pursuant to FPR 30.10, as there is a compelling reason to do so?
Baker LJ, giving the lead judgment, considered ground 4 first, noting that it raised difficult questions which required consideration of Barder v Caluori [1988] AC 20 together with Unger. He noted that s 1(1) Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 (the 1934 Act) provided that on death, all causes of action shall survive, save defamation. However the ‘orthodox’ view is that financial remedies proceedings do not survive death (based upon Sugden v Sugden [1957] P 120, holding (in the context of claims for maintenance) that there was no right to the same), but that this may not be correct given the recognition that such claims are brought as of right and thus do amount to a cause of action.
The Court of Appeal went on to consider Barder. To recap, in that case, the wife killed the children, and herself, after a financial remedies order was made, after the time for an appeal, but before the order was implemented. The order was set aside on the basis of fundamental mistake.
The Court of Appeal noted that Lord Brandon had stated (in a passage not cited in Unger) that:
‘The purpose of the statutory right of appeal is to enable decisions of a county court which are unjust to be set aside or varied by the Court of Appeal. The fulfilment of that purpose is not made any the less necessary or desirable by the death of one of the parties to the cause in which the decision was made. In a case other than a matrimonial cause I do not think that it would even be suggested that the statutory right of appeal would lapse because of the death of one of the parties to it. I cannot see why a matrimonial cause should be different in this respect. Where an appeal is brought or continued after the death of one of the parties to a cause, procedural steps have to be taken to substitute another party for the party who has died. Provision for the taking of such steps is made by rules of court.’
Thus, in Barder the House of Lords considered that both an appeal out of time and an enforcement of an order were permissible after the death of an appellant. The ancillary relief order was set aside. However, as the Court of Appeal noted, in similar circumstances, the appellate court has determined the matter: Smith v Smith [1992] Fam 69, Reid v Reid [2004] 1 FLR 736 and WA v Executors of the Estate of HA & Ors [2015] EWHC 2233 (Fam), [2016] 1 FLR 1360.
Baker LJ then considered Unger. There, the Supreme Court held that on their true construction, the statutory provisions in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) and the Matrimonial Property and Finance 1984 (MFPA 1984) (under which Unger was decided), considered in the context of the 1975 Act, created personal rights and obligations which can only be adjudicated between living parties and that the issue whether a claim for financial relief after divorce is a cause of action which survives against the estate of a deceased spouse under the 1934 Act did not arise for determination. Any change in the law was, the Supreme Court held, a matter for Parliament.
Having considered Unger, Baker LJ went on to consider Harb v King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz [2005] EWCA Civ 1324, a case that also limited relief to joint lives.
At [55], Baker LJ identified the question, which had never previously been expressed, as to whether the court has the power to set aside or vary a financial remedies order on an appeal where leave to appeal has been granted but one of the parties dies before the appeal is heard. As he noted:
‘On one reading of Lord Brandon’s analysis in Barder, there is “no good reason” why the statutory right of appeal, and the power on appeal to re-determine the claim for financial remedies, should ever lapse on the intervening death of one of the parties, a fortiori where the appellant has been granted permission to appeal. On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Unger has ruled that the Barder principles, confined to cases where a Barder event has occurred, represent “a discrete but limited exception to the general rule that the 1973 Act creates personal rights and obligations which end with the death of a party to the marriage.”.’
The argument on behalf of A was that the court could substitute a different order, and the observations above were not limited to Barder appeals. It was conceded (the author considering wrongly) that the court had the power to substitute a different order, but was argued (correctly) that Barder was limited to specific circumstances.
The Court of Appeal ducked the issue.
Baker LJ rightly found that, without a party acting for H, in circumstances in which there was no FPR equivalent of CPR 19.12 (which allows for the appointment of a party to represent an estate – probably a limitation in the FPR), and where the appellant was non-existent, it was wrong to say that the appeal was properly constituted. Therefore, the court ought to have brought the proceedings to an end, by striking out the appeal.
The conclusion is probably right, given: (1) that no one was prepared to take up letters of administration; and (2) what appears to be a failure in the FPR to provide that in the circumstances a third party can be appointed (as the CPR provides for, and which deals with similar, though not these particular, circumstances). But it is dissatisfactory. That is clear from what Baker LJ said at [80]:
‘there is clearly very considerable force in the views expressed by Mostyn J and Lord Leggatt in Unger. The forthcoming government consultation on matrimonial financial and cohabitation law may provide an opportunity for a review of the circumstances in which claims for financial remedies after relationship breakdown survive the death of one of the parties.’
However, with the greatest respect to that conclusion, and the understandable position taken at [79], that full argument is required regarding ground 4, it is disappointing that such an important issue has been ducked.
In particular, the question of how Barder fits with Sugden needs to be resolved, and the hope of parliamentary intervention does not advance the current position. The suggestion, derived from Sugden, and ducked by the Supreme Court in Unger, that financial remedies is not a cause of action and thus does not survive death, is no longer defensible. This is particularly so when the Barder jurisdiction is retained, without question. Barder is anomalous. In Unger, Lord Stephens considered that:
‘the unanimous view of the House of Lords in Barder was that the ratio of the decision in Sugden turned on the true construction of section 26(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 which created a personal obligation that lasted only so long as the husband lived.’ (at [53])
‘The Court of Appeal in Sugden also considered whether there was in existence during the lifetime of the husband an enforceable claim against him which survived against his estate under section 1(1) of the 1934 Act. It is unsurprising that the members of the court decided that there was not, given that they all agreed that section 26(1) created a personal right which ended with the death of the husband. Denning LJ stated, at page 135, that there was no “enforceable right at the time of [the husband’s] death”. Hodson LJ adhered to his judgment in Dipple v Dipple that there was no cause of action within section 1(1) of the 1934 Act except that he agreed that the word “discretionary” which he had used in coming to that conclusion in Dipple (see para 46 above) was a misleading adjective. Morris LJ stated, at page 138, that “[it] seems to me that there is no room for the application of the [1934 Act], in this case”. As the right against the husband was personal and ended on death, there was no cause of action which subsisted against and survived against his estate.’ (at [54])
Lord Stephens then held:
‘If an applicant successfully satisfies the conditions for leave to appeal applying the principles in Barder and if the appeal is allowed, then the appeal court can, on a redetermination, consider what order ought to have been made, even though one of the spouses has died. I consider this to be a discrete but limited exception to the general rule that the 1973 Act creates personal rights and obligations which end with the death of a party to the marriage, and which cannot be pursued against the deceased’s estate. I consider that this limited exception is not a sufficient basis on which to undertake a radical change to the construction of matrimonial legislation.’ (at [100])
The Supreme Court, with some discernible reluctance, has made clear that the position at law (and it is for Parliament to change this position) is that when a party to financial remedy proceedings under the MPFA 1984, but in reality, also the MCA 1973 and the 1975 Act, dies during the currency of those proceedings, the proceedings cannot be continued. The only exception is a Barder appeal. The Court of Appeal agrees. This means that, if a party to financial remedy proceedings dies, there is no further scope to progress those proceedings. There is no order under the MCA 1973 that can be made. The proceedings simply come to an end. This is the case after an appeal (if it is the case that an appeal should be able to be brought – which is probably now not right).
There are a number of issues that arise which have not been dealt with:
- What if an order had been substituted? Barder would suggest that this is permissible. But why should that be the case if remitting is not? How do you bind the estate without a personal representative? Who makes the arguments?
- How do you deal with an appeal when a party is not actually party, absent the provision in CPR 19.12? Surely Cobb LJ was right to say that there was a procedural issue, and this appeal was in effect academic – could it bind the estate without a similar provision to CPR 19.13?
- Is this really a Barder appeal? Taking aside the fact that Barder sits uncomfortably against the law – particularly Sugden as (reluctantly) applied in Unger, what makes this a case that satisfies the necessary requirements?
In reality, this is a case which demonstrates the lacuna in family law based upon fiction – Unger’s attempt to reconcile Sugden with the modern law. Sugden arose in circumstances in which Denning LJ (as he then was) tried to reconcile 1950s law with a more modern approach. Unger, and Kanabar, are the courts crying out for a solution to the trap that they find themselves in – how to deal with a situation that the common law never envisaged. The answer is simple, but, as the Supreme Court identified, it requires parliamentary intervention.