Reid-Roberts & Anor v Mei-Lin & Anor [2026] EWHC 49 (Ch)

Cawson J. Appeal and cross-appeal concerning H’s beneficial interest in the matrimonial home. Cawson J found that H had not transferred his beneficial interest to W, but that sale of the property should be deferred.

Judgment date: 15 January 2026

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/ch/2026/49

Cawson J. On appeal and cross-appeal from the order of Deputy ICC Judge Frith, 10 April 2024, [2024] EWHC 759 (Ch).

Appeal and cross-appeal concerning H’s beneficial interest in the matrimonial home. Cawson J found that H had not transferred his beneficial interest to W, but that sale of the property should be deferred.

The first instance judgment

The appellants were joint trustees in bankruptcy (hereafter ‘Trustees’) of Audun Mar Gudmundsson; [2]. The respondents were Hsiao Mei-Lin (‘W’) and Gudmundsson (‘H’). W and H had owned a property in North London (‘the Property’); [2].

At first instance, the deputy judge had held that the Trustees and W each held 50% of the beneficial interest in the Property, and that W must deliver to the Trustees vacant possession of the property in 2032, whereafter the Trustees would conduct its sale; [3].

The Trustees argued that the deputy judge was wrong: 1. to find that there were ‘exceptional circumstances’ in W’s favour for s 335A(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (‘IA 1986’) and 2. to exercise his discretion under s 335A(2) IA 1986 to prolong W’s possession until 2032; [4]. The Trustees submitted that it should be c.3 months; [4].

By cross-appeal, W argued that the deputy judge was wrong not to find that H had transferred his beneficial interest to W before his bankruptcy through a 2018 WhatsApp and email exchange and that Trustees therefore had no claim; [5].

Cawson J’s conclusion

Cawson J concluded that:

The deputy judge was right to find that H had not transferred his beneficial interest to W, although for different reasons than those found by the deputy judge.
The deputy judge was entitled to find that there were ‘exceptional circumstances’ but wrong to delay the sale until 2032; [6]. The property should be vacated by July 2027; [6].

Background

W and H had married and had purchased the property in 2009; [10]. The TR1 declared them beneficial joint tenants, though it would have been severed within the divorce proceedings and/or upon H’s bankruptcy; [10]. They had separated in 2016, and W had remained in the property with their two children; [12]. H had suffered from drug addiction, and he had subjected W to physical and mental abuse; [12]. W had commenced financial remedy proceedings in 2017; [12].

W had alleged that the parties’ 2018 communications over WhatsApp and email resulted in an immediate and effective transfer by H of his beneficial interest; [15]. These had included H’s WhatsApp message stating that ‘I can sign over my share of southcote road to u without any complications’; [16]. A later message from H then stated that ‘this is not agreed’; [16]. The relevant excerpts can be found at [16].

A bankruptcy order had been made against H in February 2020; [27]. The precipitatory statutory demand and the bankruptcy order had been raised for the first time within the financial remedy proceedings in March 2020 and therefore Judge Meston did not alter his decision to order that H’s interest in the property be transferred to W; [28]. W had applied to have the bankruptcy order annulled, although the trustees in bankruptcy had already been appointed; [29], [30]. In dismissing the annulment application, Chief ICCJ Briggs said that there was no evidence to support the ground that H was able to pay his debts as they fall due, or that he had a tangible and immediate prospect of being able to pay them; [35]. At a 2020 consequentials hearing, W had agreed to place the Property on the market; [36].

In 2023, the Property had not been sold, and the Trustees had issued an application for possession; [37]. Subsequently, H had admitted to the Trustees’ solicitors that ‘the reason for my bankruptcy was really to defeat my wife’s claim for the house’; [38]. The Trustees’ application had resulted in the deputy judge’s judgment that W would deliver up vacant possession by August 2032 with the Trustees to conduct the sale; [40].

H had appealed against the order by Judge Meston in the 2020 financial remedy proceedings, which had ordered that H’s interest in the Property be transferred to W. Peel J had allowed the appeal on the basis that, pursuant to s 283 IA 1986, Mr Gundmundsson’s assets fell within his estate for bankruptcy purposes, and that, pursuant to s 306 IA 1986, it vested in the Trustees; [42]. Peel J had ordered that if there was surplus, it should vest in W; [43].

The Trustees had been given permission to appeal, and W had been given permission to cross-appeal; [45].

The cross-appeal and the Trustees’ Respondents’ Notice thereto

The issue raised was whether the 2018 WhatsApps and emails included a disposition by H of his beneficial interest in the Property to W and it if it was in writing to satisfy s 53(1)(a) and/or (c) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (for ‘writing signed by the person’).

The deputy judge had concluded that the communications ‘evince a clear intention on the part of [H] to release his share of the [Property] to his wife’ and that because the emails had finished ‘All the best, Audun Mar Gudmundsson’, the requirements of s 53(1) were satisfied; [47], [49]. The deputy judge had concluded with respect to the WhatsApp that H’s name was ‘in the header to the messages for the purposes of identifying [H] as the sender’; [50]. The signature of the emails was not disputed, but the signature of the WhatsApps were; [49], [50]. However, relying upon Xydhias v Xydhias [1999] 1 All ER 386, the deputy judge had concluded that there had been no disposition in favour of W; [51]. The deputy judge’s reliance upon Xydhias constituted the basis of W’s appeal; [52].

Cawson J came to the ‘firm view’ that they do not demonstrate H’s intention to transfer his interests; [66]. Cawson J stated that ‘[w]hilst it might technically be possible for a WhatApp message to have the requisite dispositive intention and satisfy the requirements of s.53(1) LPA 1925’ but that the use of such a medium points against an intention to transfer the beneficial interest in a relatively high value property; [67(ii)]. Cawson J determined that the emails were proposals rather than dispositions; [67(iii)].

Cawson J noted that s 53(1) does not require the signed writing to be contained in one document, per Re Danish Bacon Co [1971] WLR 249; [72]. The WhatsApp messages showed H’s name misspelt; Cawson J proceeded on the basis that it was likely that H had put this name there, knowing that it would appear at the top of the messages; [75]. W submitted that the name was sufficient to amount to a signature; [76]. Having considered: Lobb v Stanley (1844) 5 QB 574; Holmes v Mackrell (1858) 3 CB (NS) 789; Caton v Caton (1867) LR 2 HL 127; Tourret v Cripps (1879) 48 HK Ch 567; Goodman v J Eban Ltd [1954] 1 QB 550; J Pereria Fernandes SA v Mehta [2006] 1 WLR 1543; WS Tankship II BV v The Kwangju Bank Ltd [2011] EWHC 3103; Neocleous v Rees [2019] EWHC 2462 (Ch) and Hudson v Hathway [2023] KB 345 Cawson J concluded that the name did not constitute a valid signature; [80]–[94], [102]. It ‘merely provides a mechanism’ to ‘allows the sender … to be identified’ and, as such, the heading was ‘incidental’; [95], [101].

Cawson J therefore concluded that H’s beneficial interest in the Property remained vested in him; [104].

The Trustees’ appeal

The central question for the deputy judge had been how to exercise his discretion under s 14 of TLATA 1996 on the Trustees’ application for an order for sale of the Property; [105]. Section 335A(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides that where the application is made after the end of the period of one year then the court will usually assume that the interests of the bankrupt’s creditors outweigh other considerations, but the first instance judge had found that H’s conduct and W’s mental health constituted exceptions to this presumption; [108]. The Trustees appealed this decision; [123]. There are limited circumstances under which it is appropriate for the appeal court to interfere with a judge’s decisions concerning s 335(3) IA 1986 and s 14 of TLATA; [108]. Cawson J considered Claughton v Charalambous [1998] BPIR 558; Re Spiritroom Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 932; Azam v University Hospital Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust [2020] EWHC 3384 (QB), Everitt v Budhram [2010] Ch 170; Grant v Baker [2016] EWHC 17782 (Ch); Claughton v Charalambous; Dean v Stout [2005] EWHC 3315; Re Citro (a bankrupt) [1991] Ch 142; and Re Holliday (a bankrupt) [1981] 1 Ch 405.

Cawson J concluded that the deputy judge was entitled to come to his conclusion that there were exceptional circumstances, although only with regard to 1. the delay in handing down of judgment following the financial remedy proceedings which meant that a transfer of H’s interest which would otherwise have occurred prior to the bankruptcy petition did not occur, and 2. the evidence of W and their son’s diagnosed mental health conditions; [154].

However, Cawson J concluded that the deputy judge erred in the exercise of his discretion under s 335A(2) IA 1986; [155]. Therefore, to balance the interests of creditors and the requirement to meet costs and expenses of bankruptcy against the ‘undesirable and difficult position’ of W and the children, Cawson J changed the date until which the sale should be deferred from 31 July 2032 to 31 July 2027; [165].