Important Recent Case Developments (Mid-September 2025 to mid-January 2026)

These are the noteworthy case law developments since the last issue went to press in the early autumn. Not all of them are citable as precedent, but they are all informative and a good demonstration of the cases being heard up and down the country.

Delay

Readers may remember Wyatt v Vince in the Supreme Court back in 2015 (reported at [2015] UKSC 14). In that case, there had been a 20-year delay between divorce and the financial remedy claim, and in that time the (former) wife had raised the parties’ children without much financial support from Mr Vince. In due course, he founded Ecotricity and became wealthy. That case established that there was no time limit for bringing a financial remedies claim. Although the delay would impact the provision, the court was required to consider contribution under s 25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, and her contribution of parenting had well outlasted the marriage.

G v N [2025] EWFC 286 (B) concerns an even longer delay, some 30 years. That was when the wife had departed the family home, leaving the husband and children. He then raised them with no financial contribution from the wife at all, and over time took the house from a mortgage of 90% of its value to there being no mortgage at all. This was the only marital asset. District Judge Shackleton considered in particular s 25(2)(b) needs, obligations and responsibilities, (c) standard of living, and (d) age and marital duration, and considered (f) – contribution – particularly weighty. It was unclear at what point in those 30 years a divorce had actually occurred, but once separation has occurred, subsequent endeavour is not marital (C v C [2018] EWHC 3186 (Fam)).

Silberschmidt v Richards [2025] EWHC 2841 (Fam) is a cautionary tale about the inadvisability of taunting your former spouse. The parties concluded their financial remedy claims in late 2020. In 2021 the wife received some documents in relation to the husband’s company which were irreconcilable with the picture she had been given in the financial remedy proceedings. She sought legal advice but took no action; she was at the time dealing with mental health problems, bereavement and health issues affecting close family members.

In April 2023 the husband told the wife that she had been ‘too trusting’, and ‘maybe she had now learned her lesson’, which she took to mean that he had not fully disclosed his assets in the divorce. This time the wife sought to set aside the order for fraudulent non-disclosure.

The husband argued that the wife had delayed in bringing the matter back to court, citing authorities to the effect that applications to set aside must be made with reasonable promptness. He argued that 2021 was the key date on which the wife had knowledge that she could apply to set aside, not 2023. At first instance, Recorder Chandler held that it was not until 2023 that ‘the penny dropped’. On the husband’s appeal, Poole J held that ‘the court should ask both what the applicant knew and what her circumstances were, as well as what she ought to have known with reasonable enquiry, and what she reasonably ought to have done’ (at [59]). Here, Recorder Chandler had correctly applied the law, looked at what the wife knew and when, and all the circumstances, and reached a decision that was open to him. The husband’s appeal was dismissed.

Wells sharing – ES v SS [2023] EWFC 177

HHJ Hess’s decision in ED v AO [2025] EWFC 399 is useful for its consideration of Wells sharing of the husband’s contingent future resources. The parties had agreed that Wells sharing was appropriate; the issue was how it was to be achieved.

After considering the private equity model process (described by Coleridge J in B v B [2013] EWHC 1232 (Fam)) and noting that entitlement to future carry is a hybrid resource (A v M [2021] EWFC 89), HHJ Hess worked out which of the future resources related to marital endeavour and were thus subject to sharing and awarded the wife contingent future lump sums. She therefore benefited from equal sharing when those marital endeavours were realised.

Professional conduct points

In Re M & R (Children) (Refusal of Legal Aid Costs) [2025] EWFC 299 (B) Recorder O’Grady set out how to prepare a witness statement on behalf of a non-English speaking party. In fact, this was a recitation of existing requirements, perhaps more honoured in the breach. In NN v ZZ & Ors [2013] EWHC 2261 (Fam) Peter Jackson had already set out that witness statements must be prepared in a witness’s own language, and then translated, certified and both the translation and the own-language version filed. In all cases, the statement should contain an explanation of the process by which it has been taken: for example, face-to-face, over the telephone, by Skype or based on a document written in the witness’s own language.

While acknowledging the crucial importance of evidence being accurate, this is extremely onerous and difficult to achieve, especially when (like me) you are running a pro bono clinic with a high number of clients who speak limited English. For a statement to be written in a person’s native language, they will need to work with an interpreter who will write that down, using guidance from an English-only speaking lawyer (unless the firm is fortunate enough to employ someone with the right languages), and then translated to English, and that is before we come to the role both lawyer and client have in checking accuracy and that it contains what it needs to. Amendments are inevitable, and this slows things down. None of this is of course the fault of Recorder O’Grady, who was understandably annoyed that the client’s evidence was not compliant in a number of respects, including that it was unsigned and there was no statement of truth. It is a reminder that whatever the pressures of time and workload, a client’s evidence is just that – the client’s evidence – and to be relied upon it must – of course! – be reliable and truthful.

Also on the professional conduct side is K v P (Criminal Solicitor as Court-Appointed QLR) [2025] EWFC 321. The lawyer appointed to cross-examine the mother as qualified legal representative (QLR) in children proceedings was the same person acting for the father in a parallel criminal case relating to domestic abuse by the father against the mother. This was not okay, said the President. While there was no blanket prohibition on having dual roles, the purpose of a QLR is to enhance the ability of a vulnerable party to give best evidence, and a knowledge of dual roles would diminish this. Moreover, a court-appointed QLR is not responsible to the party for whom they are appointed (s 31W(7) Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984), so it is a functionally different role to that of an instructed lawyer.

But, rather undermining these entirely valid points was the fact that if the father had directly appointed a solicitor, then that person could cross-examine the mother. And that is indeed what happened – the father instructed the QLR to go on the record as his solicitor. Nevertheless, as a vulnerable witness, Family Procedure Rules 2010 (SI 2010/2955) (FPR) Part 3A will apply, and there is excellent advice at www.theadvocatesgateway.org/toolkits – see toolkits 13 and 13A. In fact, anyone engaged in advocacy should be referring regularly to this resource.

SM v BA & Anor (No 3 Amendments to Statements of Case) [2026] EWFC 9 is immensely helpful if one is writing a skeleton dealing with late amendments to statements of case, as it sets out the many relevant authorities at some length and brings them together, making a distinction between late and very late, and what each means. It is a third reported judgment in an expensive financial remedy case that had, by this point attracted an intervenor on the issue of beneficial ownership of a property. Nicholas Allen KC, sitting as a deputy High Court Judge, noted that the FPR don’t deal with amendments to statements of case, and accordingly turned to the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998/3132) for assistance. Under CPR 17.1(2) if a statement of case has been served, a party may amend it only with: (a) the written consent of all the other parties; or (b) the permission of the court. While lateness is relative, an amendment can be regarded as ‘very late’ if permission to amend threatens the trial date (Swain-Mason & Ors v Mills & Reeve LLP [2011] EWCA Civ 14), even if the application is made some months before the trial is due to start. A heavy burden lies upon the person seeking to introduce an amended case to show the strength of the new case and why justice to him, his opponent and other court users requires him to be able to pursue it. The risk to a trial date causes the balance to be loaded heavily against the grant of permission.

Intervenor cases

In addition to the above intervenor case, there is another useful one to consider, A v N [2025] EWFC 371 (B) before Recorder Christopher Stirling. This was a financial remedies case in which the wife’s mother was intervening in relation to a substantial sum she had contributed towards the purchase of the matrimonial home, where she lived in an annex.

Section 24A(6) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 says that:

‘(6)⁠ Where a party to a marriage has a beneficial interest in any property, or in the proceeds of sale thereof, and some other person who is not a party to the marriage also has a beneficial interest in that property or in the proceeds of sale thereof, then, before deciding whether to make an order under this section in relation to that property, it shall be the duty of the court to give that other person an opportunity to make representations with respect to the order; and any representations made by that other person shall be included among the circumstances to which the court is required to have regard under section 25(1) below.’

There was, however, no case law on what representations might be relevant or how the intervenor claims should be balanced against those of the parties themselves. It was relevant that the house was the parties’ home; that it was also the home of the third party (as opposed to an investment) and had been adapted for her; whether the sale would be particularly onerous by virtue of that person’s age or medical condition; and whether it was proposed or practical that the third party should be rehoused with one of the parties. On the facts of this case, an order for sale would cause no undue disadvantage to the intervenor, who would be rehoused with the wife, her daughter, and whilst the annex was adapted for her needs, this could be reproduced in another property. In another case, where other capital resources existed, the judge noted that the circumstances might tip the balance against a sale but here there was simply no other option.

Needs in circumstances of disability or terminal illness

There are two recent cases illustrating the courts’ approaches in these situations. In OO v QQ [2025] EWFC 310 (B), the wife had terminal cancer and a life expectancy of 12–18 months. She had moved out of the matrimonial home and into rented property to be nearer the children’s schools as she could no longer drive. That freed up the matrimonial home to be sold, with HHJ Hyde KC’s order giving the husband a charge over a portion of the sale proceeds realisable on the wife’s death, retaining a flat, and paying substantial periodical payments on a joint lives basis.

Lastly, we have VP v SP [2025] EWFC 447 (B). In this case, the wife was a full-time carer for the parties’ 18-year-old son, who was disabled and unlikely to ever live independently. There were non-matrimonial assets and liabilities, and as it was an issue between the parties, the courts considered whether certain debts had become matrimonialised. Deputy District Judge Cassidy Hope attempted, without much in the way of evidence provided, to ascertain each party’s needs, the wife’s being suppressed by her caring role.

This case is also a useful reminder on how the court deals with financial remedy orders when it has not yet pronounced the conditional order. In accordance with the decision of King J in JP v NP [2014] EWHC 1101 (Fam), the judgment was to be treated as an indication of outcome with an order to be drawn and made after the conditional order was pronounced, with the court listing a mention to take place after pronouncement.

If readers are interested in how courts factor the needs of a disabled adult dependent on their parents into financial remedies, do read an article I wrote on this, ‘Maintenance for a Disabled Adult Child: A Case of Legal Blogging’, in the spring 2024 issue of FRJ ([2024] 1 FRJ 45).

This article draws on the case summaries prepared by the FRJ summariser team. As ever, I am grateful to the team.