A Shield Against Ruinous Costs: The Case for Court-Based FDRs in Intervenor Actions

[2026] 3 FRJ 230. Warring parties, whose conflicts and costs are exacerbated by the introduction of other parties, are essentially being forced to litigate a dispute without any input from an unbiased judge. How did we get here?

For any case to reach the Financial Remedies Court (FRC), a fair amount must have already ‘gone wrong’ between the parties.

If everything ‘goes right’ once that case has reached the FRC (defined loosely for the purposes of this article as settling the matter at FDR), both parties will almost invariably have paid (or owe) at minimum five-figure sums to their respective legal teams. These sums, almost invariably, will be swallowed by the party instructing those teams unless one of the few exceptions in FPR 28.3 apply.

To help parties reach the ‘least worst’ outcome once proceedings have started, the court is bound by FPR 9.15(4) to require parties to engage in an FDR:

‘(4) The court must direct that the case be referred to a FDR appointment unless—

(a) the first appointment or part of it has been treated as a FDR appointment and the FDR appointment has been effective; or

(b) there are exceptional reasons which make a referral to a FDR appointment inappropriate.’

When parties fail to reach settlement and litigate ‘to the death’, the High Court has no qualms voicing colourful criticisms about legal costs that are ‘nihilistic’,[[1]] ‘apocalyptic’[[2]] and ‘a calamitous waste of resources’.[[3]] This has no doubt played a part in the increased push towards non-court dispute resolution (NCDR) in recent years.

If the ‘standard’ financial remedy case is defined by a lot going wrong between the two parties, intervention in those proceedings by other family members takes that misery and turns it up to 11.

Now, instead of two warring parties, there are three or more. Years of resentment, unspoken grudges and imperceivable slights are laid out for all to see (usually with far more clarity than the parties themselves). The lawyers involved are tasked with untangling it all and applying it to the doctrines of equity, shoehorned as they are into the FRC.

It doesn’t take a genius to ascertain what third party intervention does to legal costs: clients can be advised to ‘take what you would have spent and double it’.

That’s bad enough, but the bad news just keeps coming: if they lose, they’ll likely be ordered to pay the other side’s costs. Usually not just one other side’s costs, but perhaps two or even three sets of costs, depending on the issues and the result.

‘Surely, the court will hold an FDR appointment to try to help us settle our differences as they would in a two-party claim?’ the fictitious, conveniently-aware-of-financial remedies-procedure client asks.

Not so: despite the duty to negotiate becoming increasingly central to financial remedies disputes, there is remarkably little encouragement for negotiated agreement in intervenor actions.

Whilst intervenor actions ‘must be approached on exactly the same legal basis as if it were being determined in the Chancery Division’[[4]] and the FPR still apply,[[5]] Part 9 does not: third party claims fall outside the definition of ‘financial remedy’ or ‘financial order’ in FPR 2.3. Hence, FPR 9.15(4) does not apply to the intervenor action itself. Therefore, there is no rules-based requirement for an FDR.

As a result, the standard approach adopted in FRCs across the country seems to involve listing the matter straight to trial, often with a multi-day time estimate, under the entirely misleading guise of a ‘preliminary issue hearing’.

The upshot is this: warring parties, whose conflicts and legal costs are exacerbated by the introduction of other parties with their own scores to settle, are essentially forced by convention to fully litigate a dispute without any conciliatory input from an unbiased judge. That cannot be right. It isn’t right. In any case not involving the highly wealthy, it almost inevitably leads to one party facing some form of financial ruin.

So how did we get here? It started with TL v ML.

The TL v ML directions

In TL v ML & Ors (Ancillary Relief: Claim against Assets of Extended Family) [2005] EWHC 2860 (Fam), Nicholas Mostyn QC (as he then was) said this:

‘[36] In my opinion, it is essential in every instance where a dispute arises about the ownership of property in ancillary relief proceedings between a spouse and a third party, that the following things should ordinarily happen:

(i) The third party should be joined to the proceedings at the earliest opportunity;

(ii) Directions should be given for the issue to be fully pleaded by points of claim and points of defence;

(iii) Separate witness statements should be directed in relation to the dispute; and

(iv) The dispute should be directed to be heard separately as a preliminary issue, before the FDR.’

This formulation was endorsed by two differently constituted Court of Appeal benches in Goldstone v Goldstone [2011] EWCA Civ 39 and Edgerton v Edgerton [2012] EWCA Civ 181, adding further persuasive effect to the judgment.

In most cases involving third party property disputes, overreliance on TL v ML has led to directions orders that effectively adopt [36] wholesale. On the whole, that is no bad thing: (1) a party who passes the test for joinder set out in FPR 9.26B (not in force at the time of the judgment) should be joined at the earliest possible opportunity to enable effective case management; (2) parties should properly plead their respective cases – doing so defines the issues and disciplines all concerned to the appropriate test; and (3) separate witness statements are necessary to enable the parties’ evidence to be tested in accordance with the rules of natural justice.

However, the assumption that third party property claims should be determined without an FDR is, in this author’s view, antithetical to the increasingly significant culture shift towards negotiation and settlement.

Nicholas Mostyn QC’s reasoning for this procedure was clear:

‘[37] In this way, the parties will know at an early stage whether or not the property in question falls within the dispositive powers of the court and a meaningful FDR can take place. It also means that the expensive attendance of the third party for the entire duration of the trial can be avoided. It is a great pity that none of these steps took place in this case. Had they happened, I believe that a great deal of the costs would have been saved.’ (emphasis added)

TL v ML concerned a claim by the wife that the family home, legally owned by her brother-in-law, was beneficially owned by the husband. That claim, the judge found, was entirely invented. Moreover, at [35]:

‘At no stage since the first appointment has this discrete issue been the subject of any case management, notwithstanding that the parties have been before the court on numerous occasions.’

It’s plain to see that the judge’s guiding principles were: (1) the appropriate pleading of third-party property issues; and (2) avoiding the unnecessary proliferation of legal costs. Arguably, the appropriate pleading of third-party property issues was intended as the means by which the unnecessary proliferation of costs could be avoided.

Adopting the TL v ML directions undoubtedly addresses the first principle. Proceeding without any consideration of a court-led or private FDR categorically fails to achieve the second. Slavish devotion to the letter of [36] has led to ongoing case management decisions which defeat the spirit of the judgment.

Shield

This was an issue highlighted, in tentative and qualified terms, by Nicholas Francis QC (as he then was) in Shield v Shield & Anor [2014] EWHC 23 (Fam).

Shield concerned an intervention by the parties’ son, Christopher, asserting a constructive trust over 50.22% of the Category A shares in a family business held by the husband. Christopher and the husband agreed that this was the case. The wife, supported by witness evidence from the parties’ daughters, denied it.

Christopher’s application to intervene was granted by District Judge Hess (as he then was) and directions given to resolve the issue prior to FDR (one can assume these were the TL v ML directions, but there is no mention of this in the judgment).

The matter proceeded to preliminary issue hearing before Nicholas Francis QC which lasted for 8 days, not including reading or judgment writing/delivery days.

To reach the end of the preliminary issue hearing, the family had spent over £1m in legal costs between them. It is not clear from the judgment between which parties those costs were divided, but on any analysis, it was a sum which no doubt would have been better invested back into the family. The core financial remedy claim remained extant and the whole family had already been effectively torn apart by the dispute.

Shield is a salutary example, albeit in a bigger money case,[[6]] of the costs exacerbated by the failure to undertake or even consider an FDR: court time, the parties’ time, financial cost and potentially irreparable relationship damage.

This does not appear to have been lost on the judge. At [108] of the judgment, he said this:

‘I note that there was no FDR in relation to the preliminary issue. Whilst, as been made clear in a number of cases, (sic) an FDR will not necessarily be appropriate to the resolution of a preliminary issue, I express the view that consideration should at least be given to the possibility of an FDR prior to the hearing of a preliminary issue. It may well have been the case here that the input of an experienced FDR judge might have helped to save this family from the course which it has taken.’ (emphasis added)

This passage in Shield is alluded to briefly in the Red Book commentary to FPR 9.17, which suggests that the Shield approach is most often utilised in practice. That is unfortunately not this author’s experience, hence this article on the Financial Remedies Journal blog.[[7]] Intervenor actions are routinely directed straight to trial without a second thought for an FDR appointment. Moreover, parties are actively arguing against FDR appointments in reliance upon TL v ML, as if it is the beginning and end of the matter.

These arguments are most certainly not made with the intention of increasing costs. More likely, they stem from the – not unreasonable – impression that TL v ML is a characteristically insightful judgment, and a Court of Appeal approved formula as to the way things should be done.

Whether this issue is brought about by a lack of knowledge of Shield, a lack of time to consider such things at the early stages of complex litigation or by the understandable desire not to be seen to depart from the law of Mostyn J, it should not continue.

A way forward?

TL v ML is not a hard and fast formula. Almost nothing in the financial remedies sphere is. Practitioners are required to analyse the case management needs of each specific case. In an intervenor action, those needs can be guided by TL v ML, Shield, the FPR and even the CPR. The aims to be achieved are these:

(1) involving the relevant parties as quickly as possible;

(2) ascertaining the exact nature of the dispute as quickly as possible;

(3) resolving the dispute as quickly and cost-effectively as possible;

(4) resolving the underlying financial remedies action as quickly and cost-effectively as possible.

To that end, perhaps it is time to introduce a broad amendment to the TL v ML directions: make a court-based FDR the default position, adopting a similar test as in FPR 9.15(4).

The broad thrust of these amended directions would look like this:

(1) The third party should be joined to the proceedings at the earliest opportunity.

(2) Directions should be given for the issue to be fully pleaded by points of claim and points of defence (with provision for reply if necessary).

(3) A further case management hearing should be listed, with the option to be vacated upon the provision of agreed directions, to consider inter alia:

(a) listing the matter for an FDR/early neutral evaluation (ENE) before a suitably qualified judge unless exceptional circumstances apply;

(b) considering whether the FDR/ENE will address just the intervention or will subsume the entire dispute;

(c) directing disclosure and inspection of any relevant documents;

(d) considering whether separate witness statements should be directed before the FDR or should follow in the event it is unsuccessful;

(e) considering such further directions as may be required to ensure the FDR judge is able to provide a suitably persuasive indication on the intervention issue and the substantive financial remedy application, if appropriate;

(f) considering how to manage the attendance of the third party to respect the parties’ confidentiality in the underlying financial remedies proceedings.

Can such change be affected?

Valid criticisms of this approach may include:

  • the increased cost of a further case management hearing;
  • whether a third-party property claim is even suitable for FDR;
  • the practical difficulty of resolving a core computational issue (third-party ownership of potentially distributable property) and the ultimate distribution of assets ‘in one sitting’;
  • how to practically manage a multi-party FDR;
  • the risk of a second FDR and trial in the financial remedy proceedings if the intervenor action isn’t resolved;
  • how to address costs between the intervenor(s) and the parties at the FDR.

Each is taken in turn.

The cost of a further hearing can be eliminated through proper engagement by legal professionals. The success of the accelerated first appointment procedure tells us this – most first appointments are avoided because appropriate directions are made by consent.

If the hearing is genuinely required, as is the case in more complex matters in the accelerated procedure, that money is an investment to ensure unforeseen case management issues do not arise in the future.

Whether an FDR appointment is a suitable forum to address third party interests in land. There is somewhat less discretionary wiggle-room available in the determination of matters arising out of third party interests in land. That is arguably more reason to justify early judicial involvement. If one party’s case is obviously stronger than another’s, that can be made clear in the indication. If the case is more likely to turn on the witness evidence, the indication will necessarily be broader.

The Chancery Division (now renamed the Business and Property Division (BPD)) has operated its own chancery FDR (Ch FDR) scheme since 2014, following the successful adoption of FDRs in financial remedy proceedings. The Chancery Guide (September 2025 update) specifically states as follows:

‘10.27 It is generally necessary for the parameters of the dispute to have crystallised before a Ch FDR takes place. This will generally not be before completion of statements of case or the exchange of evidence in a Part 8 claim.

10.28 However, if once acknowledgments of service have been filed, the parties consider that an early Ch FDR would be beneficial, they do not need to wait for the first hearing but can make an application using form N244.’

The above paragraphs can be interpreted as a restatement of the underlying aims that inspired the judgment in TL v ML: identify the issues adequately, then try to settle the matter.

Whilst Ch FDRs have not formed the bedrock of standard civil procedure in the same way FDRs have in financial remedies proceedings, their existence adds credibility to their utility in intervenor actions.

That said, the ability of the BPC to order ENE at a case management conference even if one or both of the parties don’t consent has been made expressly clear since c.2019.[[8]] This is unlikely to be particularly surprising in the current climate, considering the wide publication of the court’s power to stay proceedings to order the parties to engage in NCDR in Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1416, but it illustrates the BPC’s willingness, somewhat ahead of the curve, to enforce NCDR on unwilling parties.

If it works in the civil sphere, there is no reason to suppose it cannot work in the Family Court. In fact, given the obvious crossover between claims under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TLATA) and the claims in the Family Court, the case can easily be made for the introduction of mandatory FDRs in the county court too. It is a rare case indeed that would not benefit from an institutionally established settlement meeting chaired by an experienced judge.

Practical difficulty in resolving computational issues before meaningful indication can be given. This is something that is regularly faced in FDRs already. A great many cases reach FDR in which the parties are still not agreed as to the value or liquidity of a company, the existence or otherwise of overseas assets or the value of a particularly important chattel.

FRC judges are more than capable of giving an indication on such matters, providing the case has been managed well enough to that point. Such indications are often caveated as imperfect, and many reflect legal advice on risk that has already been given, but lay parties are almost universally assisted by hearing it from a judge.[[9]] The facts speak for themselves: most cases settle at FDR,[[10]] but most cases that reach FDR do not have all the computational issues sown up.

Practical management of multi-party FDR. Clearly, a multi-party negotiation is difficult to manage. Whether it is even feasible will depend upon the issues in the case and the will of the parties and their representatives. If a multi-party FDR is sought, it may be prudent for the intervening party to sign a confidentiality agreement regarding the underlying financial remedies case. This step is not without precedent: the Chancery Guide says this at 10.32:

‘… if the parties consider it necessary for a non-party to be present for the purposes of the negotiations because they have an interest in or are necessary for any overall resolution of the dispute, but are not a party to the claim itself, consideration should be given to the need for them to sign a confidentiality agreement and/or what role they are to have at the Ch FDR. It may affect the terms and form of any agreement reached by the parties at the Ch FDR and how it is to be approved or implemented.’

There is no reason a similar approach cannot be adopted in the FRC: ‘non-parties’ to the underlying financial remedies claim – the intervenors – can sign an agreement not to disclose any confidential information they hear in the proceedings.

If a multi-party FDR is considered desirable, a longer time-estimate may be required to facilitate an effective appointment. Dividing the appointment into two sessions, the first addressing the intervention and the second addressing the core application, may be sufficient. In some circumstances, it may be that a judge feels able to wrap up an indication in one session, especially if there are overlapping issues concerning resources available to the parties.

It also cannot be ignored that most third party interventions that pass through the FRC are ‘bank of mum and dad’ cases in which the family may be able to reach a sensible compromise on all matters in the best interests of the family and, more importantly, any children of the family. Nicholas Francis QC plainly felt similarly in Shield.

Whilst arranging a multi-party FDR is not without difficulty, it isn’t impossible. The nettle should be grasped and the matter case managed to achieve the best result for the families served by the FRC.

As for the risk of a second FDR and trial in the substantive matter, that is a risk that is difficult to escape from. However, such cases are likely to be the exception, rather than the rule.

Readers of this journal will no doubt recall matters from their own professional diaries that seemed incapable of settling only to reach a remarkably sensible compromise at an FDR. Others will recall, hopefully, fewer examples of cases that were simply intractable. No doubt there will be room for further High Court hyperbole in respect of such cases and the costs they incur, but the risk of such cases should not stand in the way of resolution of more agreeable matters.

Costs. Intervenor actions are subject to a ‘soft’ costs-follow-the-event regime.[[11]] The ‘no order’ principle of FPR 28.3(5) does not apply and CPR 44.2(4) and (5) apply instead.

It follows that intervenors (or successful defenders of such a claim) may be somewhat more concerned about costs recovery than a party in a ‘standard’ financial remedy claim. That is no reason to eschew an FDR. Indeed, an unreasonable refusal to engage in NCDR may amount to ‘conduct’ for the purposes of a civil costs order.[[12]] This echoes FPR 28.3(7)(aa) and paragraph 24 of The Financial Remedies Court of England & Wales: Financial Remedies Guide 2026,[[13]] which requires the court to have regard to any failure by a party, without good reason, to attend a mediation information and assessment meeting or NCDR. Whilst a court-based FDR is, by definition, not NCDR, the reason for these rules is the encouragement of settlement. If the rules committees, driven by the needs of court users, have introduced rules to encourage NCDR, those same rules must apply to the use of court-based FDRs as well.

Practitioners should be aware of the different costs rules and should advise their clients accordingly. Judges can give an indication of where costs are likely to fall depending on the outcome reached (there’s a strong hint in the name of the regime), and the parties can make offers taking into account litigation risk or otherwise. These sorts of considerations are commonplace in the county court but they do not appear to affect the ability of those involved to settle matters: broadly speaking, only 2%–4% of county court claims reach trial. According to the Quarterly Civil Justice Statistics: April–June 2026, 12,000 claims went to trial, whereas 571,000 claims were issued.[[14]]

Conclusion

The author may be criticised for sticking his oar in with an imperfect solution. In a situation where the very fabric of a family is tearing apart, too much has gone wrong for any resolution to be straightforward. However, pressing ahead to preliminary issue hearings without enforcing some form of court-led dispute resolution is not the answer. That was recognised in Shield and has only increased in urgency since then.

Astute readers may point out that limited reference has been made to NCDR in this article. Clearly, NCDR is an increasingly important part of financial remedies practice and the increased flexibility and control it offers makes it a more ideal solution to the problem addressed herein. But not all parties can afford such intervention and if even one of the parties is unwilling to consider such a course, then it cannot be embarked upon (unless they are ordered to do so). NCDR is being utilised to fill the cracks brought about by chronic underfunding and the re-prioritisation of judicial sitting time. NCDR should not be the only feasible option for a means to resolve complex multi-party litigation in the FRC.

[[1]]: Peel J, Crowther v Crowther & Ors [2021] EWFC 88.

[[2]]: Mostyn J, Xanthopoulos v Rakshina [2022] EWFC 30.

[[3]]: Peel J, M v M [2020] EWFC 41.

[[4]]: TL v ML & Ors (Ancillary Relief: Claim against Assets of Extended Family) 2005 EWHC 2860 (Fam) at [34].

[[5]]: See the judgments of Hughes LJ and Thorpe LJ in Goldstone v Goldstone [2011] EWCA Civ 39.

[[6]]: No effort to value the business in question was attempted, but both sides estimated it to be worth tens of millions: Shield v Shield & Anor [2014] EWHC 23 (Fam) at [10].

[[7]]: Siân Smith, ‘Intervener Cases: Preliminary Issue Hearing or FDR (or NCDR)?, https://financialremediesjournal.com/intervenor-cases-preliminary-issue-hearing-or-fdr-or-ncdr/

[[8]]: Lomax v Lomax [2019] EWCA Civ 1467.

[[9]]: See also Peel J’s forceful encouragement of the FDR process in GH v GH [2024] EWHC 2547 (Fam).

[[10]]: According to Peel J in ‘The Financial Remedies Court: A Year in Review’, [2023] 3 FRJ 170, 85%–90% of financial remedies cases settle before final hearing.

[[11]]: See Baker v Rowe [2009] EWCA Civ 1162 at [25] and Solomon v Solomon [2013] EWCA Civ 1095 at [22].

[[12]]: See CPR 44.2(5)(e).

[[13]]: www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/financial-remedies-guide-2026/

[[14]]: Whilst the claims that went to trial wouldn’t have been from the same quarterly intake of issued claims, the statistics nevertheless indicate the vast majority of claims settle before trial.

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