Re A and Z (No 2) (Interim Third Party Debt Order) [2026] EWFC 90

Judgment date: 29 April 2026

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/2026/90

HHJ McKendrick.

Overview

Decision concerning an application for an interim third-party debt order by a spouse against the solicitors acting for the other spouse after a failure to comply with previously made orders.

Background

The case concerns divorce and financial remedy proceedings between spouses A (Applicant) and Z (Respondent 1), and Z’s solicitors, Winckworth Sherwood LLP (Respondent 2); [1].

On 16 February 2026, the court determined A’s applications for a legal services payment order (LSPO) and maintenance pending suit (MPS), set aside an order for alternative service, and gave directions for a hearing on forum conveniens; [2].

Judgment was handed down on 18 March 2026 in Re A and Z: Service Out of the Jurisdiction; MPS; LSPO [2026] EWFC 64; [3].

On 27 March 2026 the court made detailed orders; [3]:

‘a. Neither party should take any further steps in any other jurisdiction for dissolution of the marriage, other than a stay;
 
b. The respondent should pay MPS arrears of £36,573, use their best endeavours to secure the rent on the London home until the end of July 2026 and pay maintenance of £13,849 per calendar month from 18 March 2026;
 
c. The respondent should pay legal fees of £175,000 by 3 April 2026, £125,000 by 10 April 2026 and thereafter £100,000 per calendar month from 6 April 2026.’

Despite representation throughout earlier proceedings, Z substantially failed to comply with the MPS and LSPO orders, jeopardising A’s ability to fairly participate in proceedings, [5].

On 16 April 2026, A applied without notice for an interim third-party debt order (TPDO) against Winckworth Sherwood LLP, alleging that the firm held funds belonging to Z; [6]. However, the application was unsupported by evidence that the solicitors actually owed money to, or held money on behalf of, Z; [7] and [8].

The law

At [9] to [17] the judge sets out the relevant law to the court’s power to make an interim TPDO, namely CPR Part 72 and PD 72.

TPDOs are discretionary, but the court will not grant speculative applications; [9] and [10].

In exercising its discretion, the court should follow the same principles as apply to charging orders. It should ‘take into account all the circumstances of the case’ and ‘do equity, so far as possible’ (Roberts Petroleum Ltd Bernard Kenney Ltd [1983] 1 AC 192); [13].

The court will likely decide against making the order if it can be shown that the third-party respondent would be prejudiced by it; [14].

The judge confirmed that TPDOs may, in principle, be made against solicitors’ client accounts. However, such orders are not common, and the applicant must show a debt is owed to it by the third-party solicitors; [15].

• In BHP Billiton Marketing Ag v Tmt Asia Ltd & Ors [2013] EWHC 4610 (Comm) a TPDO sought against a law firm was refused because the judgment creditor was unable to prove that the monies were owed by the solicitors to the judgment debtor.
• Conversely, in BCS Corporate Acceptances Ltd & Ors v Terry [2018] EWHC 2349 (QB) it was held that on an application for an interim TPDO the court was entitled to rely upon evidence that the balance in the client account was free from any claim by the solicitors or otherwise in making a TPDO.

The judge concluded that these principles should apply to a judgment debt owing in financial remedy proceedings: ‘the CPR adds to the procedural code set out in the Family Procedure Rules’; [17].

Discussion

The judge (albeit ‘with some hesitation’) made the interim TPDO; [18].

In granting it, the judge accepted that there is a debt due or accruing from the solicitors to Z, notwithstanding the limited evidential basis. He observed that TPDOs against a party’s own solicitors are unusual as they may interfere with that party’s access to legal representation, but this concern had to be balanced against the negative effects caused to A by Z’s non-compliance with the MPS and LSPO orders; [18]⁠(iii) and (iv).

He listed the matter for an early return date and gave permission for Winckworth Sherwood to file evidence; [19].

On the return date, Winckworth Sherwood provided evidence showing that the funds in Z's client account had been used or allocated, and that Z in fact owed them money; [20].

A therefore informed the court that they would not pursue their application for a TPDO and asked the court to deal with their other application regarding enforcement of previous orders; [21].

Costs

Both A and Winckworth Sherwood sought costs.

The judge ordered that A pay two thirds of Winckworth Sherwood’s costs (£15,000, reduced to £12,000); [22].

The judge noted the following:

• That usually an interim TPDO would be made on the papers without notice. However, he reminded the court that speculative applications should not be granted, [22].
• Although A’s application was due to the consequences of Z’s decision to ignore court orders, it would be unjust not to have awarded Winckworth Sherwood costs. They were made respondent to the application, required to file evidence, to attend court and the TPDO was ultimately not pursued; [23]
• He reminded that A’s without notice application was ‘high risk’; [23].
• Applicants for interim orders should note what was said by Morris J in Terry supra (at [71]) ‘there is a duty upon the applicant for an interim third-party debt order to provide accurate evidence and that there is a duty of disclosure’; [24].
• Z did not attend the hearing, and Winckworth Sherwood were in attendance in their own capacity; [25].