Thirsk v Thirsk & Ors [2026] EWHC 1501 (Ch)

Judgment date: 15 May 2026

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/ch/2026/1501

15 May 2026. Cusworth J. The claimant sought reasonable financial provision under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 following the death of her husband. The judgment considers the divorce cross check in claims by surviving spouses, the application of Standish v Standish to matrimonialisation, and the relevance of the revised Duxbury Working Party Report.

Background

The claimant and the deceased had cohabited for almost 19 years before marrying in 2021. The deceased died in 2022 leaving an estate worth approximately £30m. His will gave the claimant a life interest in the matrimonial home, a tax-free legacy of £5m, and certain chattels, with the residuary estate passing to his son from an earlier relationship. The claimant contended that the will failed to make reasonable financial provision; [1]–[16].

Divorce Cross Check

The court began by considering the provision the claimant might reasonably have expected on divorce before determining whether the circumstances justified a different outcome under the Inheritance Act 1975; [36].

Applying s 3(2), the court assessed both the claimant’s sharing entitlement and her reasonable needs, whilst recognising that the divorce cross-check is neither an upper nor lower limit on the award; [30], [36].

Sharing

Applying Standish v Standish, the court considered whether assets acquired during the relationship had become matrimonial property; [37]–[43].

The court held that although approximately £20m of assets had been acquired during the relationship, they had been funded through the deceased’s inherited and pre-relationship assets; [48]–[50].

The court held that matrimonialisation remains a fact-specific exercise. Relevant factors include the source of the asset, how it was used during the relationship, the length of that use and, where relevant, the parties’ intentions. Intention remains relevant but is not determinative; [42]–[43].

Needs and Duxbury

The court considered the revised ‘Final’ Report by the Duxbury Working Party, including its recommendation to move towards fixed-term capitalisation in many financial remedy cases; [54]–[61].

The court observed that this development may lead to greater divergence between awards under the MCA 1973 and the Inheritance Act 1975. A surviving spouse may therefore be better placed than a divorcing spouse to seek whole of life capitalised provision where the circumstances justify such an award; [59]–[61], [68].

Outcome

The court concluded that the claimant’s claim exceeded both her likely entitlement on sharing principles and the level of provision required to meet her reasonable needs; [70]. However, the court held that limiting the claimant to a life interest in the matrimonial home did not constitute reasonable financial provision; [71].

The court therefore ordered provision on the terms of the first defendant’s open offer, transferring the matrimonial home and surrounding land outright to the claimant together with her £5m legacy, the chattels provided for under the will, and interest on the outstanding balance of the legacy; [71]–[73].