McGregor v Smith (Domicile/Misuse of Divorce Portal) [2026] EWFC 128 (B)

Judgment date: 3 June 2026

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/b/2026/128

Judgment of HHJ Farquhar on the jurisdiction of the courts in domicile disputes, dealing further with applications making fraudulent use of the divorce portal.

Domicile

H was born in England and lived and worked in England until 2013 when he moved to Dubai, where he remained at the time of the hearing. The applicant considered himself to live in Bali, having property, companies, and bank accounts there.

W was born in Australia. The parties married in Australia in 2015 and lived together in Dubai. When the parties separated in 2020, W returned to Australia where she remained at the time of the hearing.

H filed an application for divorce on 17 February 2025 in which he stated that the courts in England and Wales have jurisdiction because he ‘is domiciled in England and Wales’. The applicant maintained as much until he came before HHJ Farquhar, when he stated he was in fact domiciled in Bali, Indonesia. The application before HHJ Farquhar was preceded by three separate applications, each of which stated that the applicant was domiciled in England and Wales.

W suggested that H is indeed domiciled in this jurisdiction and the reason for the volte face was that he wished to avoid scrutiny of the W’s allegation that he had acted fraudulently in attempting to secure a divorce by submitting an acknowledgement of service which he knew was not genuine.

The judge considered the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, s 5(2):

‘The court shall have jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for divorce or judicial separation if on the date of the application: … (g) either of the parties is domiciled in England and Wales.’

The Court of Appeal set the test for domicile by reference to the Rules in Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws in Raman v Kist-Ramana [2025] EWCA Civ 102; [45].

The judge considered Divall v Divall [2014] EWHC 95 that Domicile of Origin are ‘notoriously adhesive’ such that to acquire a Domicile of Choice, ‘two elements must be present at the same time: i. residence, and ii. permanent of indefinite residence’; [47].

W’s position was that H is domiciled in England and Wales, with properties and business interests in the UAE and Bali. H’s position was that from early 2022 he had formed a settled and irrevocable intention that Indonesia would be his permanent and final home, intending to retire there full-time in September 2026. The applicant had been registered for tax purposes in Bail since April 2023, had obtained ‘the most permanent residential status that was permissible’, and had registered his Last Will and Testament in Indonesia.

Despite this, the judge found that H’s Domicile of Origin had not been replaced with Bali as a Domicile of Choice. H only resided in Bail for 25–26 days in each of the last years, and thus could not be said to reside there in the present (as required by the case law); nor was he resident in Bali at the time he filed his application in February 2025.

The divorce applications

It became clear that H had filed three divorce applications preceding the present divorce application, each stating that he was domiciled within the jurisdiction and each without the knowledge of W. H had filed applications for deemed service in respect of each, claiming that ‘My wife is intentionally trying to frustrate the process by avoiding service of the divorce petition’ [18] and suggesting that ‘My wife has verbally advised me that she will not act on, or respond to the divorce petition, so as to frustrate the process’; [22]. In fact he had not served W. In his third application he exhibited an email purporting to come from W; [28]. However, the judge found that the email account did not belong to W but was created by H or on his instructions in order to obtain a divorce without W’s knowledge.

The previous applications were subsequently withdrawn and dismissed by order dated 6 January 2025.

The fourth application of 17 February 2025 was made via the HMCTS portal. There was an acknowledgement of service and purported electronic signature from W, provided on 28 February 2025. Both parties accepted at the hearing that the response was not provided by the W, and the acknowledgement of service was set aside.

Conclusion

The applicant’s application to dismiss his application for divorce on grounds of lack of jurisdiction was dismissed with the judge commenting that, despite having heard no submissions on costs, it would be ‘highly likely that there would be an order for costs against the Applicant’ given the lack of success on both of the two points raised.

This judgment has not been certified as citeable pursuant to the Practice Note (Citation of Cases: Restrictions and Rules) [2001] 1 WLR 1001.