HHJ Vincent. A Pakistani divorce was deemed to be valid in the UK on public policy grounds and permission was granted for the wife to bring financial remedies proceedings in this jurisdiction.

This hearing concerned the wife’s application under s 13 Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (MFPA 1984) for permission to bring financial remedies proceedings following the obtaining of a divorce in Pakistan, and the husband’s cross-application under s 51 Family Law Act 1986 (FLA 1986) for the court to refuse to recognise the Pakistani divorce.

The parties were both of Pakistani heritage but had been living permanently in the UK since 2003 and 2004 respectively. They married in Pakistan in 2007.

In December 2023, the wife purported to initiate divorce proceedings in this jurisdiction, but was unable to do so since the husband had destroyed the original and their only copy of their marriage certificate. The wife therefore instructed solicitors in Pakistan to assist her in obtaining a replacement copy. In May 2024, the wife instructed those solicitors to initiate proceedings for a Khula (the mechanism by which a Muslim woman can apply to end a marriage) in Pakistan.

It was agreed that:

• 12 May 2024: the husband moved out of the former matrimonial home;
• 24 May 2024: the Pakistani divorce proceedings were commenced by the wife;
• 1 July 2024: the wife travelled to Pakistan to attend a court hearing (the husband had not been told of the purpose of the wife’s trip to Pakistan);
• 15 July 2024: a provisional decree of divorce was made in Pakistan;
• 31 July 2024: the wife served a copy of the Khula on the husband via WhatsApp which was delivered and seen by the husband;
• 9 August 2024: the wife met with the husband’s assistant, who confirmed that the husband had received the wife’s message;
• 13 October 2024: the Pakistani decree was made final;
• 31 January 2025: the wife applied under s 13 MFPA 1984 for permission to apply for financial relief after a divorce;
• 4 February 2025: the husband filed an application in Pakistan seeking to set aside the decree of divorce;
• 2 May 2025: the husband made a Part 25 application for an expert to be instructed to advise on the likelihood of the Khula being set aside;
• 31 May 2025: the Pakistani court dismissed the husband’s application to set aside the Khula and stated that there would be no right of appeal from that decision. The husband did, however, appeal, and the order was suspended and a further hearing listed on 20 June 2025.

At this hearing, the husband made an application for a stay of proceedings in the first instance, or alternatively, for an adjournment for the instruction of an expert to advise on the likelihood of the Khula being set aside. Both applications were dismissed. Although the husband was challenging the validity of the Khula in Pakistan, it remained valid at least until the Pakistani court determined the issue. If it later were to be found to have been invalid, the work undertaken by the parties to resolve the question of the division of assets would not have been wasted as the parties would still wish to divorce (this was agreed), and would still need to determine that issue. In respect of the Part 25 application, it had not been properly made: there was no CV provided of a proposed expert, nor any details such as the cost of or timescales for the report.

The wife sought leave to apply under s 13 MFPA 1984. Section 13(1) required her to first obtain the leave of the court, which required her to prove that there was ‘substantial ground’ for the making of the application. An application for permission can only be made if one of the s 15 conditions is met; s 15 was made out on the basis of the parties’ domicile and property in the UK. In terms of s 16, which sets out the factors for the court to consider when determining whether there is substantial ground for making an application in the UK, the court determined that England and Wales was the appropriate venue for the wife’s application.

In terms of the husband’s application under s 51 FLA 1986, the court found that there had neither been sufficient steps taken to give the husband notice of the proceedings, nor a sufficient opportunity for the husband to have participated in those proceedings. The court was referred to:

• MM v VHM [2023] EWHC 2988 (the divorce was not recognised as valid: the husband was found to have deliberately failed to have taken sufficient steps to notify the wife by hiding from the court her whereabouts);
• TI v LI [2024] EWFC 163 (the divorce was recognised as valid: although the wife was not personally served, she had had actual knowledge of the proceedings and an opportunity to participate);
• Dahur-Johnson v Dahur-Johnson [2005] 2 FLR 102, setting out the applicable principles in applications for refusal to recognise an overseas divorce at [44].

Although it was agreed that the wife had sent to the husband a copy of the decree by WhatsApp on 31 July 2024, and confirmed with the husband’s assistant that he had received the same, the wife had known since 12 May 2024 that the husband was no longer living at the family home and it was her responsibility to inform her solicitors of the same. There was a period of time between the issuing of proceedings in Pakistan (24 May 2024) and before the first hearing (9 June 2024) to inform the husband during which the wife could have, and should have, notified the husband. At the hearing on 9 June 2024, the court had tried to ascertain the husband’s address from the wife, but the wife declined knowledge of any other addresses at which the husband could be residing. The wife also had not told the husband the purpose of her visit to Pakistan. Although there were bail conditions in place against the husband, the wife could have effected service by employing a process server or instructing solicitors in the UK. All this meant that the husband had not had sufficient notice of, nor an opportunity to participate in, the Pakistani proceedings.

The court went on to consider whether there were any public policy arguments in favour of recognising the divorce in the UK and concluded that there were. Whilst it was found to have been ‘deceitful and unfair’ for the wife to have acted as she had, at [90], on balance, the public policy considerations weighed against the refusal of recognition of the divorce:

• The wife had been frustrated in her attempts to proceed with the English divorce as the husband had destroyed the marriage certificate, which necessitated the instruction of lawyers in Pakistan by the wife. Otherwise, she would have commenced proceedings in the UK.
• This was not a case in which the wife obtained the divorce overseas with a view to disadvantage the husband.
• The wife brought her application for permission to bring financial remedy proceedings in the UK on notice to the husband.
• The husband’s argument that the way in which the divorce was obtained (‘by falsehood’) was enough to render it unrecognisable in the UK was dismissed as: this had not been raised before and the wife was not in a position in which she could fairly respond to it; the court was in no position to reach conclusions regarding those facts; the court was slow to assume that the court of another country would allow a decree based on falsehood; it could not be said that the only interpretation was that the wife had lied to the court about the facts surrounding the husband’s departure from the family home; and the order had remained in force and valid despite the husband’s attempts to challenge its validity in Pakistan.
• The husband had not acted promptly in challenging the wife’s actions; he had waited three months before issuing his application to set the decree aside from the time at which he was notified of it.
• The husband initially took no issue with the wife’s application for permission, but then changed his mind, causing delay and additional hearings.
• There had been delays within these proceedings caused by the husband seeking adjournments.
• If the court were not to recognise the divorce, the parties would have to start all over again in this jurisdiction, causing a ‘limping divorce’.

HHJ Vincent therefore: determined that the public policy arguments fell in favour of recognising the Khula under s 15 MFPA; made an order for the recognition of the divorce pursuant to s 51 FLA; and granted the wife permission to bring a claim for financial remedies in the UK under s 13 MFPA.