Awolowo v Awolowo [2026] EWFC 31

Peel J. Final hearing in a high net worth case under Part III of the MFPA 1984 with issues of non-disclosure, litigation misconduct and wife’s claim assessed on the basis of her needs.

Judgment date: 16 February 2026

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/2026/31

Peel J. Final hearing in a high net worth case under Part III of the MFPA 1984 with issues of non-disclosure, litigation misconduct and wife’s claim assessed on the basis of her needs.

Factual background

W and H are Nigerian nationals who had lived in England since 2009. They have four children (19, 16, 14 and 12 years old). They married on 24 December 2004 and separated in February 2015. W and the children continued to live in England and H moved back to Nigeria. The children have not had any direct contact with H since 2017.

On 2 October 2018, W applied for permission to seek relief under Part III of the MFPA 1984 and she was given permission on 17 October 2018 to bring her application. On 16 August 2019, the Family Court made an interim maintenance order ordering H to make payments of £1,000 per month to W (in addition to child maintenance payments of £400 per month). H continued to pay £400 per month until September 2025 at which point payments ceased. H did not make any of the £1,000 per month payments.

A preliminary hearing determined that there was no debt of £1.6m owed by H to his brother’s company; that the registration of a Nigerian order in the QBD (against the FMH in favour of H’s brother’s company) should be set aside; and that the charging order should be set aside.

Computation

When considering issues of computation, Peel J concluded the following: the only visible asset was the FMH in H’s sole name with net equity, after a secured debt for unpaid school fees of ~£30,000, was £1,940,000. There had been two other properties owned either by H or a company belonging to H: these properties had been sold by the time of the final hearing and just £23,557.00 remained from the net proceeds of sale.

W was determined to have negligible assets of her own. She had liabilities amounting to £649,528, which were largely made up of unpaid legal fees of £607,174 (previous costs orders had been made against H and H’s brother’s company and remained outstanding).

When considering issues of non-disclosure, J Peel referred to the case of Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482 (extracts edited for length):

‘[86] My broad conclusions as to the approach the court should take when dealing with non-disclosure are as follows. …
 
[87] (i) It is clearly appropriate that generally, as required by s 25 of the 1973 Act, the court should seek to determine the extent of the financial resources of the non- disclosing party.
 
[88] (ii) When undertaking this task the court will, obviously, be entitled to draw such adverse inferences as are justified having regard to the nature and extent of the party’s failure to engage properly with the proceedings. However, this does not require the court to engage in a disproportionate enquiry. Nor, as Lord Sumption said, should the court ‘engage in pure speculation’. …
 
[89] (iii) … There will be cases where … the manner in which a party has failed to comply with their disclosure obligations, means that the court is ‘unable to quantify the extent of his undisclosed resources’,…
 
[90] (iv) How does this fit within the application of the principles of need and sharing? The answer, in my view, is that, when faced with uncertainty consequent on one party’s non-disclosure and when considering what Lady Hale and Lord Sumption called ‘the inherent probabilities’ the court is entitled, in appropriate cases, to infer that the resources are sufficient or are such that the proposed award does represent a fair outcome…
 
[91] …This does not mean, as Mostyn J said in NG v SG, at para [7], that the court should jump to conclusions as to the extent of the undisclosed wealth simply because of some non-disclosure. It reflects, as he said at para [16]⁠(viii), that the court must be astute to ensure that the non-discloser does not obtain a better outcome than that which would have been ordered if they had complied with their disclosure obligations.’

Within his judgment, Peel J went onto consider the case of Ditchfield v Ditchfield [2023] EWHC 2303 (Fam) and highlighted this:

‘The law is clear. The court is entitled, in the absence of full and frank disclosure, to draw adverse conclusions where appropriate and to the degree of specificity or generality deemed fit. A non-disclosing party cannot complain if the lack of disclosure leads the court to make an order which by necessity is based on less secure foundations than the court would wish; that is the fault of the miscreant party.’

Distribution

When considering issues of distribution, Peel J made the following findings:

  • The extent of H’s assets cannot be determined beyond a general conclusion that he has access to undisclosed wealth.
  • H had substantial assets in 2007 (including disclosure of assets of £6m for the purpose of a visa application) and while it does not follow that his wealth is of that order now, H offered no explanation as to what happened to those assets nor produced any documentation of the same. The most recent accounts from H’s company dated back to 2018 when it held tangible assets in Nigeria of ~£4.5m (based on exchange rates) but no explanation was provided as to what happened to that property or any other assets.
  • It is likely that H has assets in Nigeria, but the extent of such assets is impossible to say. Accordingly, the resources in the matter were assessed as: i) the FMH; and ii) H’s unquantifiable interests in Nigeria.
  • It is appropriate to make an order pursuant to s. 16 of the MFPA 1984: parties lived in London as a family from 2009 until 2015; W and the children have continued to live here; the children are educated here and are at school here; the FMH is situated here; W works here; W’s connections with this country are stronger than her ties in Nigeria; and to expect W to litigate in Nigeria (where the £1.6m allegedly remains owing to H’s brother’s company by way of a judgment debt) would be unjust.
  • The starting point is an equal division of £970,000 to each party. However, W’s housing needs were assessed at £1,000,000 (inclusive of stamp duty, purchase costs and refurbishment).
  • H’s housing needs were not ignored: he has sufficient wealth to enable him to buy a two or three bedroom property in a suitable part of London or Nigeria (where he has lived since separation).
  • W’s debts should be met from the proceeds of sale of the FMH: they are a direct product of H’s litigation misconduct and non-payment of interim maintenance.

The outcome

The FMH shall be sold with the net proceeds of sale divided 90.21% to W and 9.79% to H of net equity of £1,940,000 (any surplus shall be divided equally); and H shall retain the proceeds of sale of the two additional properties.

W’s share was broken down as follows:

  • £649,528 to repay her debts;
  • £72,000 for unpaid interim maintenance (in breach of an interim maintenance order);
  • £1,000,000 for housing; and
  • Capitalised child maintenance at £400 per month for 6 years.

H’s share of 9.79%, coupled with his undisclosed assets, is sufficient for his needs.

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