Peel J. H’s D11 application in relation to the implementation of a final order in matrimonial finance proceedings.

The funds which were the subject of this application were £900,000 held by H for the benefit of the parties’ daughter, A. She had a chromosomal disorder which resulted in lifelong care needs. The parents were awarded £5m after their successful claim relating to the antenatal care W received during pregnancy.

Each party held £900,000 on behalf of A. In the final order the monies were to be used to purchase accommodation and released and paid to A on certain trigger events. Using the £900,000 W redeemed her mortgage on the London property and H placed £250,000 in an account and applied £650,000 to a property in London in which he was to live. All of this was a part of the final order.

However, H was required to remortgage the property and did not think the order would allow this without W’s agreement or court permission. Whether he needed permission was open to debate. H also wished to apply the £250,000 to the property to obtain a mortgage for £750,000 as opposed to £1m. For this, the order was clear that permission from W was required and in the absence of it, H needed an order of the court. W rejected both requests in November 2024. In February 2024 she said she would consent but only if certain child arrangements and other matters were agreed to. This was rejected by H.

Procedural history

The application was listed for 11 April 2024. W did not instruct solicitors until the day before the hearing and sought an adjournment. This was granted but W was directed to file a statement setting out her objections to the application. She did not.

At the hearing of 24 May 2024 W applied for an adjournment again. This was refused on the basis that she had had enough time to prepare but had not filed any evidence and H needed the application decided with some urgency in order to move home.

Conclusion

Mr Justice Peel ‘unhesitatingly’ granted the application for the remortgage because it was the only way H could live in the home, there was no detrimental financial impact on A, the order envisaged remortgaging, and the result was in essence continuing the status quo.

The application to apply a further £250,000 to the mortgage was also granted. This was on the basis that it would not impact A negatively, it would make their housing more stable, and the original order envisaged each party spending £900,000 on their housing and H was simply doing this at a later date than W.

Peel J suggested that W’s ‘mistrust of H coloured her response to what was essentially a straightforward, limited application brought by H’.

H was also awarded two-thirds of his costs given that the D11 fell within the ‘clean sheet’ category of cases. He obtained these on the basis that W raised irrelevant issues at the hearing, the first hearing was abortive due to her lateness in instructing solicitors, H made an open proposal to which W did not respond, and H made it clear from the off that all the protective measures in the original order would remain in place if she consented.